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I. INTRODUCTION
The inherent conflict between creditors and shareholders1 has long occupied
courts and commentators interested in corporate governance.2 Creditors holding fixed
claims to the corporation’s assets generally prefer corporate decision-making that
minimizes the risk of firm failure. Shareholders, in contrast, have a greater appetite for
risk, because as residual owners, they reap the rewards of firm success while sharing
the risk of loss with creditors.3
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Some of the best work in this area occurred in the period during and following the spate
of highly leverage acquisitions of the 1980s. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt
Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of Restructuring, 1989 Duke L.J. 92; Morey W.
McDaniel, Bondholders and Corporate Governance, 41 Bus. Law 413 (1986); Morey W.
McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. Corp. L. 205 (1988); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The
Fairness Rights of Corporate Bondholders, 65 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1165 (1990). Commentators also
provided an empirical look at the impact of leveraged transactions of the 1980s. See, Hurst &
McGuinness, The Corporation, The Bondholder and Fiduciary Duties, 10 J. Law and Commerce
187, 190 (1991) (reporting that between 1984 and 1989, more than 230 companies were involved
in transactions that caused a downgrading of their debt instruments), and Marcel Kahan and
Michael Klauser, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds: Bondholder Protection or Management
Entrenchment?, 40 UCLA L. Rev. 931, 993, n. 2d (1993) (reporting that between 1984 and 1988,
“mergers, acquisitions or leveraged buyouts” caused the bonds of 183 companies to lose value).
See, also, Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., A Positive Analysis of the Common Law of
Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 84 Ky. L. J. 455, 460-69 (1995-96) (hereinafter, “Campbell, A
Positive Analysis”)(demonstrating the conflicts among shareholders, creditors and other
corporate constituencies and the impact of managerial actions on the various corporate
constituencies).
2

See, Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 1189 (2002) (describing the academic debate between Professors Berle and Dodd
during the 1930s).
3

Consider the following simple example. Assume a corporation has a value of 100,
which is represented by 50 in debt and 50 in equity. The corporation has an opportunity to re1

Traditionally, this conflict is mediated by a governance structure that imposes a
fiduciary duty on the corporation’s managers – its officers and directors – to maximize
the value of the shareholder’s interests in the firm.4 In this traditional view, officers and
directors serve as agents of the shareholders and thus are charged with a fiduciary duty
to maximize the value of the principals’ ownership interests. Under this model of
corporate governance, managers are not agents for the company’s creditors and thus
owe no fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of creditors.5
For the most part, this traditional model of corporate governance has dominated
corporate law.6 Over recent years, however, a number of courts have suggested or
invest its assets in a way that has a 50% chance of achieving a value of 200 and a 50% chance of
achieving a value of 0. Creditors, as a result of the reinvestment will have an expected value of
25, which consists of a 50% chance of 0 (= 0) and a 50% chance of 50 (= 25 [because of their
fixed obligation, if the company achieves a value of 200, creditors still receive only 50]).
Shareholders, however, have an expected reinvestment value of 75, which is a 50% chance of 0
and a 50% chance of 150 (if the company achieves a value of 200, shareholders are entitled to
200 minus the 50 claims of creditors).
4

See, e.g., Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 Geo. L. J. 439, 468 (2001) (managers have “duties to serve the interests of shareholders
alone . . . .”); Roberta Romano, A Cautionary Note on Drawing Lessons from Comparative
Corporate Law, 102 Yale L. J. 2021, 2031 (1993) (U.S. corporation law seeks “to maximize
shareholder welfare.”).
5

Although one is able to find occasional cases according creditors fiduciary or fiduciarylike protections, see, e.g., Swinney v. Keebler Co., 329 F. Supp. 216 (D.S.C. 1971, rev. on other
grounds 480 F. 2d 573 (4th Cir. 1973), such cases are aberrational and inconsistent with the long
standing, see, e.g., H. Ballantine, CORPORATIONS 184 (Rev. Ed. 1946) (“[c]reditors have no
direct right of action against directors or officers for mismanagement . . . by the better view.”)
and widely held rule that mangers owe creditors no fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)(no fiduciary
duties owed to bondholders); Skinner v. Hulsey, 138 So. 769,773 (Fla. 1931) ("Directors are not
liable to the creditors on the theory of being fiduciaries."); Confick v. Houston Civic Opera
Ass'n. 99 S.W.2d 382, 385 (Tex. 1936) ("Directors are not personally liable to creditors for
mismanagement, or for waste of assets except on proof of the commission of such fraud.");
Whitfield v. Kern, 192 A. 48, 55 (N.J. 1937) ( management is not the agent for creditors).
6

While not arguing that directors owe any affirmative duty to act in the best interests of
non-shareholder constituencies, a recent line of scholarship argues that directors are not obliged
to act in the best interests of shareholders. This line of scholarship interprets modern corporate
law as giving “directors free rein to pursue strategies that reduce shareholder wealth while
benefitting other constituencies.” Stout, supra note 2, at 1202. At another point in her piece,
Professor Stout states that “corporate law . . . generally allows directors to redirect wealth from
shareholders to other stakeholders.” Id., at 12023. As a positive matter, we reject this
2

held that these normal fiduciary duties of corporate managers may change when firms
move into and through periods of deepening financial distress.
Courts have staked out at least four separate periods as a company moves
across a spectrum from financial solvency to bankruptcy. The first period along the
spectrum is the normal or solvent period for the corporation.7 Next is a period when the
corporation is not yet insolvent but is close to insolvency. Sometimes this period is
called the “vicinity of insolvency” or the “zone of insolvency”.8 Next, as conditions
continue to deteriorate, is a period in which the corporation is insolvent but has not yet
filed for bankruptcy.9 Finally, the fourth period commences when the corporation files a
bankruptcy petition and, we assume, begins reorganization under Chapter 11.10
While generally across this time spectrum courts define fiduciary duties as an
obligation to maximize some “value,” the question of whose value is to be maximized in
any given period is uncertain. Three possible beneficiaries of managers’ value
maximization obligation have emerged from the cases. The beneficiaries may be: (1)
shareholders; (2) creditors; or (3) the “corporation”, which should be interpreted as
some combination of corporate stakeholders. The cases hold or suggest that obligation
of corporate managers in normal or solvent periods is to act in the best interests of
shareholders11 but that the duty changes to an obligation to act in the best interests of
the corporation once the firm enters the vicinity of insolvency.12 As the firm’s financial
distress deepens and it passes out of the vicinity of insolvency and into actual
insolvency, cases suggest or hold that the obligation of managers becomes a duty to
maximize the interests of creditors.13 Finally, when the company enters bankruptcy and
is operating under Chapter 11, the cases hold or suggest that the obligation is to
maximize the total interests of creditors and shareholders as a whole.14
This line of cases is rife with uncertainties. Defining the perimeters of the periods
is often difficult. An obligation to act in the best interests of the “corporation” raises the
interpretation and side with the traditional view that managers owe duties to the owners of
corporations. See infra notes 17-38 and accompanying text.
7

See infra notes 17-38 and accompanying text.
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See infra notes 53-70 and accompanying text.

9

See infra notes 39-78 and accompanying text.

10

See infra notes 79-94 and accompanying text.

11

See infra notes 17-27 and accompanying text.
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See infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.

13

See infra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.

14

See infra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
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question of which of the corporate stakeholders or constituencies (e.g., employees, the
community) are included in the “corporation”. Is the obligation of corporate managers to
act in the best interests of the preferred constituency (e.g., creditors) unbending, or is it
permissible for managers to pursue a path that benefits a non-favored constituency
(e.g., shareholders) at the expense of the favored constituency (e.g., creditors)? If
managers are permitted to pursue such a path, is there a limit on the extent of the
permissible sacrifice managers may visit on the favored constituency?
These shifting duties and the accompanying uncertainties cause problems for
managers attempting to live up to their legal obligations. Even more important to us,
however, is the pernicious impact that such confusion has on the pricing of capital and
the allocation risks among investors. When shareholders and creditors contribute their
capital to a corporation, they price their investment and shape the terms of their contract
in part by reference to fiduciary duties and the extent to which they are the beneficiaries
of managers’ fiduciary obligations.15 Confusion and complexity respecting the matter of
whose value in what period managers are obliged to maximize make it nearly
impossible for investors – shareholders and creditors – to price the capital they
contribute to the corporation and to allocate the risk of loss in corporate transactions to
the most efficient bearer of that risk.16
The purpose of this article is two fold. First we offer a positive analysis of the
fiduciary duties of managers, as corporations move along the time spectrum from
solvency to Chapter 11 reorganization. While, certainly, we are unable to clarify entirely
the mess that courts have created, we believe that we are able to offer guidance
regarding the present state of the law and how the law is likely to evolve on these
important matters.
In the second part of the article, we offer our prescription for corporate managers’
fiduciary duties, as corporations move along the time spectrum from solvency to
15

A classic example is a provision in a loan agreement limiting the amount of dividends
that can be distributed to shareholders. Without such a covenant, managers may have an
incentive to pay large dividends to shareholders, making it less likely that the company can repay
creditors according to the terms of their loan contract.
16

The court’s opinion in Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716
F. Supp. 1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), is interesting in this regard, since it affirms a view of fiduciary
duties during normal or solvent periods that enable investors – shareholders and creditors – to
price their capital they contribute and allocate risk among various investors. In that case,
bondholders argued that an implied term in their contract and fiduciary duties prevented RJR
from assuming additional debt that depreciated the market value of the plaintiffs’ bonds. In
rejecting these claims, the court pointed out that the plaintiffs were some of the most
sophisticated lenders in the country and had relinquished covenants that would have protected
them from the adverse effects of additional leverage. In short, the court concluded that these
very sophisticated lenders had assumed and priced the risk of additional leverage by RJR.
4

bankruptcy. Our view is that the fiduciary obligation of corporate managers should be
uniform across the pre-bankruptcy period, changing only at the point the company
enters into Chapter 11. Our prescription is informed by simple economic concepts. Our
view is that clear and efficient default rules are of the utmost importance, since such
rules will protect the expectations of the parties, respect their pricing, and thus facilitate
an efficient allocation of the risk of loss in financial transactions.

II. POSITIVE ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE FIDUCIARY DUTIES
A. In Normal or Solvent Periods
In normal times – before a company enters bankruptcy or otherwise gets itself in
a situation of financial distress – the fiduciary duties of corporate managers are often
articulated by reference to best interests of “the corporation”.17 Notwithstanding such
language, it is generally conceded that corporate managers are under a duty to act in
the best interests of the company’s shareholders,18 a duty that is often stated in terms of
an obligation to maximize shareholder wealth.19
17

For example, in their fine treatise, JAMES D. COX AND THOMAS LEE HAZEN
CORPORATIONS (2d 2003), the authors state that “[w]hen directors or officers are guilty of
mismanagement or negligence in conducting corporate affairs, the right of action is primarily in
the corporation . . . .” Id., at 217. The authors go on to indicate that the managers’ duties are
defined by the interests of shareholders: “It is broadly recognized that the directors . . . owe their
fiduciary obligations to the corporation and its shareholders; creditors rights are accordingly
limited to the fair construction of a creditor’s contract with the corporation.” Id.
18

The fiduciary duties owed to shareholders are typically broken down into two
components, the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. See, e.g., COX AND HAZEN, supra note 17,
at 184-207. Under their duty of care obligation, corporate managers are obliged to act with a
degree of care in regard to the maximization of shareholder wealth. The degree of care directors
are required to observe may differ, depending on whether the directors are involved in
monitoring or making discrete decisions. In monitoring, directors are most likely judged against
a reasonableness or negligence standard. See, e.g., Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A. 2d 814
(S. Ct. N.J. 1984). In cases involving discrete decisions – a decision to facilitate the sale of the
company, for example – directors operating under the business judgment standard may be held
liable only if their decision is so unreasonable as to amount to gross negligence. See, e.g.,
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A. 2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (“. . . under the business judgment rule
director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross negligence.”). Whether the matter involves
monitoring or a discrete decision, managers’ duty of care is measured against the obligation to
act in the best interests of shareholders.
19

See supra note 4. See also, Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy in
the Convergence Debate, 16 Transnat’l Lawyer 45,48 (2002) (“Despite occasional academic
5

A corollary of this fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of shareholders is that
corporate managers owe no fiduciary duty to the corporation’s creditors20 or any other
non-shareholder constituency, such as employees.21 Duties to creditors (and other nonarguments to the contrary, the shareholder wealth maximization norm . . . indisputably is the law
in the United States.”); ROBERT CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 678 (1986) (“. . . from the traditional
legal viewpoint, a corporation’s directors and officers have a fiduciary duty to maximize
shareholder wealth, subject to numerous duties to meet specific obligations to other groups
affected by the corporation”). A recent line of scholarship, developed in large part by Professors
Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout, interprets the duties of managers somewhat differently
from the traditional view. See, Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory
of Corporate Law, 85 Va. L. Rev. 247 (1999) This view rejects any ubiquitous obligation on the
part of directors to act in the best interests of shareholders, and instead argues that “corporate law
. . . generally allows directors to redirect wealth from shareholders to other stakeholders.” Stout,
supra note 2, at 1203. According to Professor Stout, “Delaware gives directors free rein to
pursue strategies that reduce shareholder wealth while benefitting other constituencies.”. Id., at
1202 . The authority relied upon to support this position includes the right of corporations to
make charitable contributions, court opinions in takeover cases that allow directors to consider
the interests of non-shareholder constituencies, and state constituency statutes. See, Blair &
Stout, supra note 19, at 285; Stout, supra note 2, at 1201-1207.
20

In addition to the cases cited in note 5, supra, the following cases are examples of
decisions that support the lack of any managerial fiduciary duty to creditors: Pittsburgh
Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & O.R.R. 680 F. 2d 933, 941 (3d Cir.), cert. denied. 459 U.S. 1056
(1982); Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A. 2d 215 (Del Ch. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 347 A. 2d 133
(Del. 1975). See also, Lawrence Mitchell, supra note 1 at 1169, n.11 ("scholars supporting
expanded bondholder rights do not have a great deal of law supporting them.").
21

While as a positive matter, no one argues that managers owe any fiduciary duty to act in
the best interests of employees, some scholars have argued that employees are especially
vulnerable to expropriative conduct by corporate managers operating in the best interests of
shareholders. One argument is that employees make human capital investments in their firms
and underprice their services in their early years with their firm in return for an implied promise
from the firm to repay the employees in their late years. Firms may have an economic interest in
breaching this implied promise. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Policing Employment
Contracts with the Nexus-of-Contracts Firm, 43 Toronto L.J. 353, 363-69 (1993); Katherine
Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders under State Nonshareholder Constituency
Statutes, 21 Stet. L. Rev. 45, 48-53 (1991); and Marleen O'Connor, Restructuring the
Corporation’s Nexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers,
69 U.N. Carol. L. Rev. 1189, 1205-07 (1991). Predictably, other scholars argue that workers are
fully capable of protecting their interests through contract and pricing. See, e.g., Richard
Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51, Chi. L. Rev. 947, 954-55 (1984) (“people who
are competent enough to marry, vote and pray are not unable to protect themselves in their dayto-day business transactions”). Other scholars also point out that expropriation of employees
human capital investment may not be in the corporation’s best interest. Clive Bull, the Existence
6

shareholder constituencies) are purely contractual in nature,22 except for discrete legal
duties imposed on the corporation (and its managers), such as duties to refrain from
paying excessive dividends to shareholders23 or engaging in fraudulent transfers.24
To illustrate these basic points, consider an example roughly based on the RJRNabisco case.25 Target is acquired in a highly leveraged acquisition. It is an all cash
deal at a price that amounts to a large premium over Target’s market price.
Shareholders as a whole are better off as a result of the acquisition. The additional
leverage, however, causes a significant loss in the market value of Target’s credit
instruments.
Target’s managers who facilitate this acquisition appear to be acting consistent
with their obligation to maximize the wealth of Target’s shareholders. It does not matter
that part of Target shareholders’ gain came at the expense of the company’s creditors.
Managers owe no broad fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of creditors.26
of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts, 102 Q.J. of Econ. 147, 149-54 (1987) (creates morale
problems for remaining workers); Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital
Investments, and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 Duke L.J. 173,
192 (“employers’ need to maintain its reputation in the community and to attract new workers in
the future will tend to discourage exploitation”).
22

See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp.
1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (refusing to find any implied term limiting the company’s assuming
additional debt and refusing to extend any extra-contractual protections to creditors); Katz v. Oak
Indus. Inc., 508 A. 2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) (rejecting any duty to act in the best interests of
creditors and stating that “if courts are to provide protection against such enhanced risk, they will
require either legislative direction to do so or the negotiation of indenture provisions designed to
afford such protection.”)
23

The Model Business Corporation imposes both a balance sheet and an insolvency test
on a corporate board’s right to pay dividends. Model Business Corporation Act § 6.40(c) (2005).
This provision is designed to protect non-shareholder constituencies against payment of
excessive dividends to shareholders.
24

Unif. Fradulent Transfer Act, 7A U.L.A. 643 (1984): 11 U.S.C. Sec. 548 (2005).

25

Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504
(S.D.N.Y. 1989).
26

While one may imagine that most highly leveraged acquisitions are powered, at least to
some degree, by efficiencies, see Campbell, A Positive Analysis, supra note 1, at 460-69, it is
conceivable that some acquisitions may be powered only be expropriation and indeed may even
generate negative efficiencies or synergies. To use very simple numbers, assume that as a result
of an acquisition creditors lose $20, shareholders gain $10 and no other corporate constituency is
affected. Even in that case, where the acquisition generates negative synergies, creditors would
have no basis for a claim that the transaction violated any fiduciary duty owed to them.
7

Target’s creditors’ protections come only from the covenants in their indenture and from
the extra contractual protections found in discrete legal rules of the kind mentioned
above.27
The foregoing discussion and example show that corporate managers’ fiduciary
duty to shareholders is defined in terms of the duty to maximize the total wealth of
shareholders considered as a whole. There is, however, a second component to the
fiduciary duty of corporate managers, and that is a duty to refrain from facilitating wealth
transfers detrimental to any portion of the shareholders.28 Even if a transaction
27

The court in Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A. 2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986) stated:

It is the obligation for directors to attempt, within the law, to maximize the long-run
interests of the corporation stockholders; that they may sometimes do so “at the expense”
of others . . . does not for that reason constitute a breach of duty. It seems likely that
corporate restructuring designed to maximize shareholder values may in some instances
have the effect of requiring bondholders to bear greater risk of loss and thus in effect
transfer economic value from bondholders to stockholders. . . . But if courts are to
provide protection against such enhanced risk, they will require either legislative
direction to do so or the negotiation of indenture provisions designed to afford such
protection.
28

Two examples of transactions that may involve wealth transfers detrimental to some
part of the shareholders are, first, affiliated acquisitions, which are discussed below in the text,
and, second, single company recapitalizations, by which we mean corporate transactions that
affect the rights of shareholder – most usually preferred shareholders – but that otherwise do not
change the nature of the corporation or its assets. Examples of cases involving single company
recapitalizations include Goldman v. Postal Telegraph, Inc., 52 S. Supp. 763 (D. Del. 1943)
(changing preferred's liquidation preference); Bowman v. Armour & Co., Superior Court, Cook
County 1959 (unreported), rev. 17 Ill.2d 43, 160 N.E.2d 752 (1959) (changing redemptive
rights); Bove v. The Community Hotel Corporation of Newport, Rhode Island, 105 R.I. 36, 249
A.2d 89 (Sup Ct. R. I. 1969) (changing preferreds' entire bundle of rights). The following are
examples of cases in which preferred shareholders’ dividend arrearages were eliminated: Barrett
v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198 (D.Del. 1943), aff'd, 146 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944);
Western Foundry Co. v. Wicker, 85 N.E.2d 722 (Ill. 1949); State v. Bechtel, 31 N.W.2d 853
(Iowa 1948), cert, denied, 337 U.S. 918 (1949); Dratz v. Occidental Hotel Co., 39 N.W.2d 341
(Mich. 1949).
Although many of the single company recapitalization cases are older and thus do not
benefit from more modern jurisprudence and scholarship regarding fiduciary duties, the cases
generally hold that corporate managers or controlling shareholders must avoid transactions that
treat the preferred shareholders in a manner that is unfair, grossly unfair or amounts to
constructive fraud. See, e.g., Bailey v. Tubize Rayon Corp., 56 F. Supp. 418 (D. Del. 1944)("so
unfair as to amount to constructive fraud"; "gross unfairness"; although actual analysis appears to
utilize a more rigorous fairness standard); Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp. 53 F. Supp. 198
(D.Del. 1943), aff'd 146 F. 2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944)( "constructive fraud", "bad faith" and "gross
8

increases shareholder wealth considered as a whole, managers breach their fiduciary
duty by facilitating a transaction that transfers wealth from any group of shareholders
(minority shareholders, for instance) to other shareholders (majority shareholders, for
instance) or to non-shareholder constituencies.
This rule can be illustrated by an example based roughly on Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc. Assume that Parent owns a majority interest in Subsidiary and that the managers
of Subsidiary, who are nominees of Parent, facilitate a merger of the Subsidiary into
Parent in which minority shareholders of Subsidiary are frozen out at an unfairly low
cash price. Assume further that the transaction is neutral regarding creditor wealth and
generates efficiencies that enhance total shareholder wealth. The problem, of course,
is that the merger effects a wealth transfer from minority shareholders to majority
shareholders, and that amounts to a breach of managers’ fiduciary duties to minority
shareholders, even though total value of shareholder wealth is increased by the
freezeout merger.
29

Corporate managers’ fiduciary duties, therefore, are defined by reference both to
wealth maximization and wealth transfers. Simply stated, managers owe a duty to
maximize the total wealth of shareholders as a whole and owe a duty not to facilitate
wealth transfers detrimental to any group of shareholders.
While the fiduciary duty of corporate managers is stated in terms of a duty to act
in the best interests of shareholders, that duty has always been subject to certain carveouts that permit corporate managers to make limited wealth transfers from shareholders
to other corporate constituencies. Importantly, however, these carve-outs have never
been defined as a duty to make such wealth transfers. Rather, the carve-outs only
amount to a right to make such transfers, and the right has always be subject to explicit
or implicit limitations.
One finds various examples of these carve-outs from the obligation to maximize
shareholder wealth. Familiar examples of carve-outs include the rights of corporate
managers to cause their corporation to make charitable contributions,30 deploy
unfairness"); Bowman v. Armour & Co., Superior Court, Cook County 1959 (unreported), rev.
17 Ill.2d 43, 160 N.E.2d 752 (1959)( "actual or constructive fraud" or "bad faith or reckless
indifference"); Bove v. The Community Hotel Corporation of Newport, Rhode Island, 105 R.I.
36, 249 A.2d 89 (Sup Ct. R. I. 1969) (court concluded that recapitalization met the most rigorous
fairness standard).
29

457 A. 2d 701 (Del. 1983). The facts of that case as reported suggest that the
acquisition of UOP by Signal generated efficiencies that increased shareholder wealth as a
whole.
30

MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 3.02 (2005) (general power to “do all things
necessary or convenient . . . , including . . . power: . . . (13) to make donations for the public
welfare or for charitable, scientific, or educational purposes”). See, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
9

defensive tactics in the face of an unsolicited takeover bid31 and make transfer
payments to employees.32
Constituency statutes are legislatively approved examples of such carve-outs.33
Broader versions of constituency statutes apply to any actions of directors34 and
typically expressly permit directors in taking action on behalf of the corporation to
consider, in addition to the interests of the company’s shareholders, the “interests of . . .

GOVERNANCE § 2.01(b) (1994) (authorizing gifts of a “reasonable amount of resources to public
welfare . . . and philanthropic purposes”, even though “corporate profit and shareholder gain are
not thereby enhanced”).
31

For example, the Principles of Corporate Governance state that board facing an
unsolicited tender offer may deploy defensive measures “if the action is a reasonable response to
the offer.” PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 6.02(a) (1994). The Principles go on to
state that in determining whether the action is “reasonable” the board may “have regard for
interests or groups (other than shareholders) . . . if to do so would not significantly disfavor the
long-term interests of shareholders”. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 6.02(b)2)
(1994). One finds similar language from significant acquisition cases. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A. 2d 946, 955(right in the face of an unsolicited takeover bid for
board to consider “impact on ‘constituencies’ other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers,
employees, and perhaps even the community generally)”).
32

See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01(b) (Illus. 20) (1994)(an
example involving a legally non-required payment to employees that are discharged by the
company due to the company’s closing of a plant. Even though such payments were not wealth
maximizing for shareholders or the corporation, payments were a permissible “humanitarian”
undertaking for the company).
33

Presently, about 30 states have some form of a constituency statute. See Martin Lipton,
Twenty-/Five Years after Takeover Bids in the Target’s Boardroom: Old Battles, New Attacks
and the Continuing War, 60 Bus. Law. 1369, 1371, n. 3 (2005)(“Approximately thirty states
currently have constituency statutes in effect.” Mr. Lipton provides citations to all such states).
The following are examples of some of the thoughtful articles that have been written on
constituency statutes: James J. Hanks, Jr., Playing with Fire: Nonshareholder Constituency
Statutes in the 1990s, 21 STETSON L. REV. 97 (1991); James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent
State Legislation on Director and Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. Law.
1207 (1988); Alexander C. Gavis, A Framework for Satisfying Corporate Directors's
Responsibilities Under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes: The Use of Explicit
Contracts, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1451 (1990).
34

See, e.g., Kentucky Revised Statute 721B.12-210 (4) (directors may consider nonshareholder constituencies in discharging duties in connection with business combinations “or
otherwise”).
10

employees, suppliers, creditors [and others] . . . .”35 The statutes amount to express
permission for directors to facilitate actions that transfer wealth from shareholder to nonshareholder constituencies.
In all cases, however, there are significant limits on the amount of shareholder
wealth that managers may transfer to non-shareholder constituencies. The limits are
usually described in general terms of “reasonableness”.
The Principles of Corporate Governance, along with their Comments and
Illustrations, illuminate this “reasonableness” limitation. For example, the Principles
affirm the right of management to make a “reasonable amount [emphasis added]” of
charitable contributions.36 Regarding the use of defensive tactics in the face of an
unwanted takeover bid, the Principles affirm the right of the board to take such action,
so long as it “would not significantly disfavor the long-term interests of shareholders
[emphasis added].”37 Perhaps the best illumination from the Principles of the
“reasonableness” limitation is in two Illustrations in which a company proposes to
continue operating an unprofitable plant in order to benefit non-shareholder
constituencies, principally employees.38 The Illustrations conclude that the board could
continue to operate the plant for a short period of time in order to ease the plight of
employees who will loose their jobs but that the company is quite limited in how long it
may operate the plant and how much of a loss is “reasonable” in such circumstances

35

See, e.g., Kentucky Revised Statutes 271B.12-200 (4) (2005). Under that statute
directors
. . . may consider, in addition to the interests of the corporation’s shareholders, any of the
following:
(a) The interests of the corporation’s employees, suppliers, creditors and
customers;
(b) The economy of the state and the nation;
(c) Community and societal considerations; and
(d) The long-term as well as the short-term interests of the corporation and its
shareholders, including the possibility that these interests may be best served by the
continued independence of the corporation.
36

PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01(b) (1994) (authorizing gifts of a
“reasonable amount of resources to public welfare . . . and philanthropic purposes”, even though
“corporate profit and shareholder gain are not thereby enhanced”).
37

PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 6.02(a) (1994) (board may deploy defensive
tactics in the face of an unsolicited bid “if the action is a reasonable response to the offer”, and in
determining whether defensive tactics are “reasonable”, the board may “have regard for interests
or groups (other than shareholders) . . . if to do so would not significantly disfavor the long-term
interests of shareholders.”).
38

PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01, Illus. 19 & 20 (1994).
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The positive analysis we offer in this section leads to the conclusion that
corporate managers’ fiduciary duties in normal or solvent periods are defined by
reference to the best interest of the company’s shareholders. Corporate managers owe
a fiduciary duty to maximize total shareholder wealth and a duty not to facilitate wealth
transfers detrimental to any of the shareholders. These duties, however, are subject to
certain carve-outs that enable managers to facilitate limited amounts of wealth transfers
from shareholders to other corporate constituencies. Corporate managers owe no
similar fiduciary duties to creditors. As a result, except for a very few discrete rules,
such as limitations on the payment of dividends and prohibitions against fraudulent
transfers, creditors for their own protection must rely on contractual protections that they
construct and negotiate in each deal.
B. In Periods of Insolvency and Its Vicinity
While the positive analysis we offer in the preceding section suggests that
corporate managers’ fiduciary obligations in normal or solvent periods is to pursue the
best interests of shareholders, courts in some cases – principally in cases from
Delaware – have constructed different fiduciary duty regimes that they apply when the
company is in or approaching insolvency. These cases raise difficult interpretative
matters that include not only the matter of defining the nature of fiduciary duties during
these periods but also the matter of defining the perimeters of the periods themselves.
1. Insolvency.
Under Delaware law, once a company becomes insolvent, the duty of the
corporation’s managers no longer amounts to an obligation to pursue the best interests
of shareholders. Instead, as the Delaware court stated in Geyer v. Ingersoll Publications
Co.,39 directors of an insolvent firm operating outside bankruptcy “are said to owe
fiduciary duties to company’s creditors.”40 Delaware defines insolvency in this context as
either “a deficiency of assets below liabilities with no reasonable prospect that the
business can be successfully continued in the face thereof”, or “an inability to meet
maturing obligations as they fall due in the ordinary course of business.”41
39

Geyer, v. Ingersoll Publications Co., 621 A. 2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992).

40

Id., at 787, cited with approval in Production Resources Group, LLC. V. NCT Group,
Inc., 863 A.2d 772,790-91 (Del. Ch. 2004).
41

Siple v. S & K Plumbing and Heating, Inc., 182 WL 8789, at *8 (Del. Ch. 1982), cited
with approval in Production Resources Group, LLC v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A. 2d 772, 782
(Del. Ch. 2004).
In In re Healthco International, Inc., 208 B.R. 288 (D. Mass 1997), the court appears to
extend this fiduciary duty owed by managers to creditors into the period before the company
becomes insolvent. The court stated: “When a transaction renders a corporation insolvent or
12

The reason offered for this dramatic shift – away from the normal obligation of
managers to maximize shareholder wealth – is that during insolvency creditors, as
opposed to shareholders, bear the brunt of damages for stupid or dishonest managerial
conduct.42 If, to use a simple example, the value of a company’s assets is 80 and the
claims of creditors are 100, a bad managerial decision that reduces the value of the firm
to 60 injures, most apparently, the creditors, not the shareholders, who were underwater
even before the bad act.
Not only does this shift rest on problematic policy bases – a matter we discuss
later – but also this shift in insolvent periods toward protecting the interests of creditors
generates a number of difficult interpretative issues.
43

We are, for example, able to offer at least three alternative interpretations
regarding the nature of such any such fiduciary duties owed to creditors. The first
possible interpretation is that the creditors and shareholders simply exchange places as
the beneficiaries of corporate managers’ fiduciary duties. Under this approach, at least
as we have defined corporate managers’ duties during normal periods, managers
during insolvency would be obliged to maximize the value of the creditors claims,
subject to the right, but not any obligation, to make reasonable amounts of wealth
transfers from creditors to other constituencies, including shareholders. This represents
a strong version of fiduciary duties to creditors.
Under a semi-strong version of a fiduciary duty to creditors, managers during
insolvency would be obliged to consider the best interests of creditors and shareholders
as a whole.44 This version is analgous to managers’ present fiduciary during normal
periods to minority and majority shareholders as a whole. Managers operating in
brings it to the brink of insolvency, the rights of creditors become paramount.” Id., at 300
(emphasis added). This is apparently contrary to the position of the Delaware court in Credit
Lyonnais, see the discussion at notes 53-56 and accompanying text, infra, which defines
managers’ fiduciary duties in the “vicinity of insolvency” as being owed to the “community of
interest”.
42

See Production Resources Group, LLC v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A. 2d 772, 790-93
(Del. Ch. 2004) (describing creditors of an insolvent corporation as “the principal constituency
injured” by mismanagement). In Hechinger Investment Company of Delaware v. Fleet Retail
Finance Group, et al., 274 B.R. 71, 89 (D. Del. 2002), the court stated that when a company
“enters the zone of insolvency, the creditors – and not just the shareholders – are residual risk
bearers”; the court stated that “directors can be said to be ‘playing with creditors money.’”
43
44

See infra notes 125-132 and accompanying text.

This would be similar to the rule that we believe applies during Chapter 11
reorganizations, when managers are obliged to maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate. See
infra notes 79-93 and accompanying text.
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normal or solvent periods presently have fiduciary duties both to the minority and
majority shareholders, even though the interests of these two groups of shareholders
may differ, and are obligated to maximize the total value shareholder interests as a
whole and are prohibited from facilitating wealth transfers between groups of
shareholders.45
A third possible interpretation is a weak version of fiduciary duties to creditors.
Under this interpretation, managers would continue to owe their primary duties to
shareholders but would be accorded more leeway in making decisions that effect wealth
transfers from shareholders to creditors. To use an example, if one assumes that in a
normal or solvent corporation a board, consistent with the members’ fiduciary duties,
perhaps could make a decision that reallocated 5% of shareholder wealth to creditors,
in an insolvent period the board could reallocate 30% of shareholder wealth to
creditors.46
The confusion regarding the nature of corporate managers’ duties when
operating in a period of insolvency is significant and pernicious.47 Perhaps most
45

Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A. 2d 701 (Del. 1983), holds that managers operating in
solvent periods breach their fiduciary duty by facilitating a transaction that transfers wealth from
minority shareholders to majority shareholders. See generally, Campbell, A Positive Analysis,
supra note 1, at 455-469 (describing, with graphic representations, fiduciary duties to
shareholders and the fiduciary duty rule that prohibits corporate managers from facilitating
wealth transfer transactions detrimental to any shareholder group).
46

This appears to be the interpretation of Chancellor Strine in Production Resources
Group, LLC v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A. 2d 772, 788 (Del. Ch. 2004) with regard to fiduciary
duties of corporate managers when the corporation is in the “vicinity of insolvency.” See the
discussion at notes 66-69 and accompanying text, infra.
47

Unfortunately, court decisions following the Geyer decision have only confused matters

more.
One of the most dramatic examples of a court’s confusion can be seen in Hechinger
Investment Company of Delaware v. Fleet Retail Finance Group, 274 B.R. 71 (D. Del. 2002).
In considering whether directors of Hechinger acted consistent with their fiduciary duties when
they approved a LBO, the court assumed in a motion to dismiss that Hechinger was insolvent at
the time of the approval of the LBO. The court at one point states that “insolvency triggers
fiduciary duties for directors for the benefit of creditors . . . . [emphasis added]”; in the
immediately following paragraph, however, the court states that “in insolvency, the directors’ . . .
fiduciary duties are to multiple constituencies . . . [and] that in insolvency the duty runs not
directly to the creditors but to the ‘community of interest.’ [emphasis added]” Id., at 90. This
reflects a fundamental confusion regarding the beneficiaries of managers’ fiduciary duties when
the company is insolvent. When operating in insolvency, do corporate managers owe a duty to
act in the best interests of creditors, or do they owe a duty to act in the best interests of some
combination of the corporation’s constituencies (e.g., some combination of creditors, preferred
14

obviously, uncertainty over the proper interpretation of the duty to creditors makes it
difficult for managers operating in periods of insolvency to make legally proper
decisions. Assume, for example, that corporate managers operating in insolvency are
offered two alternate investment opportunities for the company. Confusion about which
interpretation of the duty to creditors is applicable may make it impossible for managers
to select the investment that is consistent with their legal duties to creditors. 48
While, certainly, we are concerned with the plight of corporate managers
attempting to deal with the meaning of their duty to creditors in times of insolvency, also
important to us are the problems the confusion generates regarding investment risk
allocation and pricing of capital by investors. When investors contribute their capital to
a corporate enterprise, they demand a return that depends on the terms of their
investment contract. Implicit in shareholders’ investment contract is an obligation that
corporate managers will act to maximize the value of their interests, and shareholders
price their investment in light of that managerial obligation. A corollary is that corporate
creditors construct the terms of their investment contract and price their investment
based on the assumption that no fiduciary duties are owed to them. Confusion on the
shareholders, majority common shareholders, minority common shareholders, employees,
suppliers, the community, etc.)?
48

Consider the following example in that regard. Assume B Co. is insolvent with assets
worth 80 and creditors’ claims amounting to 100. Managers are offered two alternate reinvestment opportunities. The first is an opportunity to re-invest the company’s assets in a
project with a 50% chance of amounting to 100 and a 50% chance of amounting to 80. The
project has a total expected value of 90 ((.5 x 80 ) + (.5 x 100) = 90), and creditors’ reap the
entire gain. Shareholders still have an expected value of 0. The second opportunity involves a
project with a 50% chance of amounting to 50 and a 50% chance of amounting to 150. The
expected value of that project is 100 ((.5 x 50) + (.5 x 150) = 100), which as a whole is superior
to the first project. Creditors, however, are worse off, since the expected value of their claim is
75 (50% chance of 50 and a 50% chance of 100). Shareholders are better off under this
investment, since their claim now has an expected value of 25 (a 50% chance of 0 and a 50%
chance of 50). For similar examples, see Laura Lin, Shift of Fiduciary Duty upon Corporate
Insolvency: Proper Scope of Directors’ Duty to Creditors, 46 Vand. L. Rev. 1485, 1489-91
(1993) and Alon Chaver & Jesse M. Fried, Managers Fiduciary Duty upon the Firm’s
Insolvency: Accounting for Performance Creditors, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 1813, 1821-25 (2002).
Under the strong version of fiduciary duties to creditors – obligating managers to act in
the best interests of creditors -- managers would likely be obliged to select the first investment,
since it maximizes the creditors’ interests. Under the semi-strong version – obligating managers
to maximize the value of the interests of creditors and shareholders as a whole – managers
would likely be obliged to select the second investment but may still face the question of whether
a fiduciary duty to creditors can be reconciled with a transaction that actually decreases the
wealth of creditors. Under the weak version of the duty to creditors – obligating managers to act
in the best interests of shareholders but permitting them to make larger wealth transfers to
creditors – managers may be able to choose either investment and still be consistent with their
fiduciary duties.
15

part of shareholders and creditors regarding these duties of corporate managers may
lead to unintended outcomes, which means that investors may have mispriced their
capital.49 Efficient and accurate ex ante allocation of risk of loss and pricing depends on
intelligible rules regarding the beneficiaries of corporate managers’ fiduciary duties.
Notwithstanding the substantial confusion in this area, our positive analysis
supports the conclusion that the duty of managers during periods of insolvency run to
creditors and that courts are most likely to interpret this duty in terms of creditors’
stepping into the shoes of shareholders. Our positive conclusions are supported by
Chancellor Strine’s analysis in Production Resources.50 After describing directors in
insolvency as owing “fiduciary duties to the company’s creditors,”51 Strine suggests
strongly that the only change in directors’ duties in insolvency is a change in “the
constituency on whose behalf the directors are” to pursue wealth maximization.52

49

Assume, for example, that an investor taking an equity position in a corporation
requires a 10% return on her investment, due in part because the investor believes that mangers
in all instances are obliged to pursue a path that maximizes the value of shareholders’ interests.
If, instead, the rule is that at some point managers’ duties shift and to an obligation to pursue a
path that maximizes the best interests of creditors, the equity investor may demand a return of
11% (rather than 10%) on her investment. Similarly, a creditor who demands a 6% interest rate,
due in part because the investor believes that managers are in all instances obliged to pursue a
path that maximizes the value of shareholders’ interests, may be willing to accept a 5% interest
rate, if managers are required at some point to act in creditors’ best interests.
Confusion about the existence of a rule requiring this shift or the meaning of the
obligation to act in the best interests of creditors may make it impossible for shareholders and
creditors to price their investments.
50

Production Resources Group, LLC. V. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A. 2d 772 (Del. Ch.

51

Id., at 791.

2004).

52

Id. Although this interpretation has a symmetrical appeal and may seem easiest to
apply, courts applying a step-into-the-shoes duty on behalf of creditors will still have tough
issues to consider. Perhaps the most difficult issue will be the extent to which, under a step-intothe-shoes regime, courts will permit managers to take action that benefit the un-privileged
constituency – now shareholders – at the expense of the privileged class – now creditors. In
normal or solvent periods, we concluded that such wealth transfers benefitting creditors at the
expense of shareholder may be possible, provided such wealth transfers were reasonable in
amount. See supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text. Some commentators, however, argue
that directors have nearly unlimited power in solvent periods to transfer wealth from
shareholders to creditors and other corporate constituencies. See supra note 19 and
accompanying text. Transporting such an interpretation into insolvency – in a reversed form, of
course – would seem to do substantial damage to the perceived need to protect creditors from a
diminution in the value available to pay their claims.
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2. Vicinity of Insolvency
Delaware courts have created a third zone that might be described as a prebankruptcy period in which the company is near, yet short, of actual insolvency.53 The
seminal case here is Credit Lyonnais,54 where Chancellor Allan stated that when “a
corporation is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely
the agent of the residue risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise.”55
Chancellor Allan continued, stating that the board’s obligation in such circumstances is
“to the community of interest that sustained the corporation . . . to maximize the
corporation’s long-term wealth creating capacity.”56
Reserving for later a consideration of the appropriateness of repeatedly shifting
fiduciary standards as a company passes from solvency to the vicinity of insolvency to
actual insolvency,57 the opinion in Credit Lyonnais creates a number of difficult
interpretative problems.58

53

One of the problems with this third zone is the difficulty in defining its perimeter. See
infra notes 59 and accompanying text. Our description of the perimeter – “near but yet short of
actual insolvency” – is not intended as a basis for any definition or re-definition of the vicinity of
insolvency.
54

Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland N.V. v. Pathe Communications Co., 1991 WL 277613
(Del. Ch.).
55

Id., at 34.

56

Id.

57

See infra notes 121-134 and accompanying text.

58

The opinion in In re Healthco International, Inc., 208 B.R. 288 (D. Mass 1997) shows
the confusion in this area. Healthco appears to make creditors the beneficiaries of managers’s
fiduciary duties in the vicinity of insolvency, although this certainly is not entirely clear from the
opinion. In Healthco. the court stated: “When a transaction renders a corporation insolvent or
brings it to the brink of insolvency, the rights of creditors become paramount.” Id., at 300
(emphasis added). This appears contrary to the position of the Delaware court in Credit
Lyonnais, which defines managers’ fiduciary duties in the “vicinity of insolvency” as being owed
to the “community of interest”. See supra notes 55-56, and accompanying text,. It is also
unclear, whether the “brink of insolvency” in Healthco is the same as the “vicinity of
insolvency” in Credit Lyonnais. In Healthco, the court suggested that the “brink” of insolvency
is a situation in which the corporation has “unreasonably small capital”, or when the corporation
faces an “reasonable risk of insolvency, not necessarily a likelihood of insolvency.” In re
Healthco International, Inc., 208 B.R. at 302. The “vicinity of insolvency” was undefined by the
court in Credit Lyonnais. See infra notes 59-60 and accompanying text.
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Commentators have pointed out, for example, the obvious interpretative difficulty
in charting the perimeter of the “vicinity of insolvency”.59 It is an inherently vague
standard, which the Court in Credit Lyonnais made no attempt to define.60 With
managers now facing three different fiduciary obligations – depending on whether the
company is solvent, insolvent or in the vicinity of insolvency – managers are left with
little idea about when they might be in the vicinity of insolvency and thus legally bound
to pursue a path that is consistent with their obligation to the “community of interest”,
instead of a path that is consistent with either the best interests of shareholders (solvent
period) or the best interests of creditors (insolvent period).
Equally perplexing and troublesome are ambiguities concerning the scope of the
“corporate enterprise” or the “community of interest”,61 which the Credit Lyonnais case
makes the beneficiary of managers’ fiduciary duties while the corporation is operating in
the vicinity of insolvency.62 The discussion of the court in Credit Lyonnais focuses
entirely on two constituencies – shareholders and creditors.63 There are, however,
other corporate constituencies that might be included in the “community of interest”,
including, for example, employees and the community.64 What is uncertain is whether

59

See, e.g., Royce de R. Barondes, Fiduciary Duties of Officers and Directors of
Distressed Corporations, 7 GMLR 45, 72 (1998) (“If uncertainty necessarily exists as to whether
a corporation’s financial position meets a well-articulated test – one of the multiple definitions of
insolvency – this uncertainty is compounded as to whether a corporation’s financial position
meets an imprecise test.”). Professor Barondes also is troubled by the ambiguity in the term
“wealth creating capacity.” Id., at 73.
60

Id., at 72 (“The Court did not even announce an imprecise test as to when a corporation
is in the vicinity of insolvency.”).
In Healthco, the court use the term “brink” of insolvency and attempted to amplify the
meaning of this term as a situation in which the corporation has “unreasonably small capital”, or
when the corporation faces an “reasonable risk of insolvency, not necessarily a likelihood of
insolvency.” In re Healthco International, Inc., 208 B.R. 288, 302 (D. Mass. 1997). See the
discussion in note 41, supra.
61

Professor Barondes is also troubled by the ambiguity in the term “wealth creating
capacity.” See, e.g., Id., at 73.
62

¶Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland N.V. v. Pathe Communications Co., 1991 WL
277613, at 34 (Del. Ch.).
63
64

Id., at 34 and note 55.

See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A. 2d 946, 955 (target board may in
the face of an unsolicited takeover bid consider “impact on ‘constituencies’ other than
shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community
18

the obligation of managers operating in the vicinity of insolvency to maximize the best
interests of the “community of interest” requires or permits managers to consider the
best interests of constituencies such as employees and the community, or, alternatively,
whether managers are only to consider the interests of shareholders and creditors.65
Chancellor Strine’s sweeping dictum in Production Resources66 exacerbates the
ambiguities of Credit Lyonnais. To Strine, Credit Lyonnais dictates no fundamental shift
in corporate managers’ fiduciary obligations when their company enters the vicinity (or,
as he calls it, the “zone”) of insolvency.67 The fundamental obligation to act in the best
interests of shareholders continues. Strine views Credit Lyonnais as merely creating a
“shield” for corporate managers, a shield that apparently allows managers operating in
the vicinity of insolvency more discretion to make decisions that benefit creditors at the
expense of shareholders.68 In short, the duty of corporate managers in the vicinity of
insolvency, as Strine sees it, continues to be an obligation to act in the best interests of
shareholders, subject, however, to an expanded right (but no obligation) to transfer
wealth from shareholders to creditors.
Strine’s fundamental point – that moving from solvency to the vicinity or zone of
insolvency should not change managers’ basic fiduciary obligation to act in the best
interests of shareholders – is in our view sound.69 The interpretative difficult, however,
generally)”). See also the discussion of constituency statutes at notes 33-35 and accompanying
text, supra.
65

Consider the following example, which is based to some extent on an illustration from
the Principles of Corporate Governance. See, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 2.01,
illus. 19& 20 (1992). While operating in the vicinity of insolvency, managers are faced with a
decision whether to close an unprofitable plant, which will result in the lay off 1,000 employees
and economic devastation of the small community in which the plant is located. Closing the
plant will increase the value of the interests of shareholders and creditors as a whole but will be
contrary to the best interests of employees who will lose their jobs and the community which will
lose its major employer. It may be that, considered as a whole, the interests of shareholders,
creditors, employees and the community will actually decrease in total, but, obviously that is
nearly impossible to determine.
66

Production Resources Group, LLC v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A. 2d 772 (Del. Ch. 2004).

67

See, e.g., id. at 788, n. 52 (“seems . . . less plausible that directors’s duties somehow
change profoundly as the firm approaches insolvency”).
68

Strine states that “Credit Lyonnais provided a shield to directors from stockholders who
claimed that the directors had a duty to undertake extreme risk . . . .” Id. at 788. The imagined
facts are that the company is offered an investment opportunity that will reduce the value of the
interests of the creditors and shareholders considered as whole but will benefit shareholders.
69

See infra notes 125-134 and accompanying text.
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is that Strine’s rule in Production Resources cannot be reconciled with Credit Lyonnais.
Simply stated, the rule from Production Resources is that managers operating in the
vicinity of insolvency owe the duty to maximize the interests of shareholders, subject to
an expanded right to take actions that benefit non-shareholder constituencies at the
expense of shareholders. The rule from Credit Lyonnais is that managers in the vicinity
of insolvency owe the obligation to maximize the interests for corporate constituencies
as a whole. Those amount to different rules that posit different duties for managers and
thus may obligate managers to pursue different paths in order to comply with their
fiduciary duties.
Our positive analysis suggests to us that courts are likely to take Credit Lyonnais
at face value and thus likely to apply the rule as there articulated – that when operating
in the vicinity of insolvency, managers owe fiduciary duties to “the community of
interest.” We fully appreciate, however, the confusion on this matter and that
Chancellor Strine’s opinion in Credit Lyonnais only adds to the confusion regarding the
proper interpretation of Credit Lyonnais. We also reiterate the point from the
immediately preceding section of this paper – that the confusion has pernicious effects
on corporate managers attempting to comply with their fiduciary duties and on the
efficient allocation and pricing of investment risks.70
C. Bankruptcy Court’s Interpretations of Managers’ Duties Before Bankruptcy:
Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein71
Under the positive analysis that we have so far constructed, the nature of
managers’ fiduciary duties depends on the financial situation of their company at the
time managers take the action in question. Thus, if at the time managers’ actions occur
the corporation is solvent, managers fiduciary duties are to shareholders; if, however, at
the time of the managers’ action the corporation is in the vicinity of insolvency,
managers duties are to the community of interest, and if the corporation is insolvent at
the time, managers owe their duties to creditors.
The court in Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein,72 however, appears to apply
a different analysis. Wieboldt suggests – perhaps rather strongly – that any claim of a
pre-bankruptcy breach of fiduciary duty against corporate managers, if raised in a
bankruptcy proceeding, will be measured against the best interests of creditors, no
matter whether at the time of the alleged breach the company was solvent, in the
vicinity of insolvency or insolvent.

70

See supra note 49 and accompanying text.

71

94 B.R. 488 (N.D. Ill. 1988).

72

Id.
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In Wieboldt, corporate managers approved a series of transactions in an LBO
that resulted in lucrative payments to shareholders and that added substantial secured
debt owed by Wieboldt. In less than a year, the company filed a bankruptcy petition,
and the debtor in possession representing the interests of the unsecured creditors, sued
the managers, claiming, inter alia,73 that managers breached their fiduciary duties by
facilitating the LBO and thereby failing to preserve the corporate assets for the benefit of
creditors.
The court in Wieboldt found that the complaint alleged sufficient facts to support
a breach of fiduciary duty claim against the directors.74 While the analysis and the
language of the court are confusing, the decision rests squarely on a duty that
managers owed to creditors,75 and the opinion offers no suggestion that the obligation
to creditors depends on the corporation’s insolvency. So interpreted, the case would
recognize a fiduciary duty to creditors anytime a claim for a pre-bankruptcy breach of
that duty is raised in a bankruptcy proceeding, irrespective of the whether at the time of
managers’ actions the company was solvent, in the vicinity of insolvency or insolvent.

73

The plaintiff also claimed the the LBO involved actual or constructive fraudulent
transfers and were thus voidable under Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C §548
(2006). Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein, 94 B.R. 488, 493 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (plaintiff
sought “to avoid the transactions constituting the LBO on the grounds that they are fraudulent
under federal and state fraudulent conveyance laws”). Such claims have become common in
bankruptcies resulting from failed LBOs and are based on the idea that because the proceeds of
the acquisition debt is paid to the shareholders, the target corporation received less than a
reasonably equivalent value for the debt. A successful application of the theory results in some
combination of a recovery of the amounts paid to shareholders and a cancellation of the debt and
security interests incurred and granted in the deal.
74
75

94 B.R. at 510.

For example, the court at one point states that “A corporate board of directors has a
fundamental duty to protect the corporate enterprises from ‘harm reasonably perceived,
irrespective of its source’”, citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, 492 A. 2d 946, 954(Del.
1985). Id., at 509. At another point the court stated that the board is required to “determine
whether the offer is in the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders.” Id., at 509-510.
At another point the language appears to recognize that the core beneficiaries of managers’
fiduciary duties are creditors: “Wieboldt, as debtor-in-possession of its bankrupt estate, clearly
may assert a claim for breach of fiduciary duty on behalf of its group of unsecured creditors.”
Id., at 508-509.
Notwithstanding this confusing language, it is clear that creditors are the beneficiaries of
the duties articulated in Wieboldt. The core of the claim in Wieboldt is that shareholders
benefitted by transferring wealth to themselves from creditors.
21

This interpretation of Wieboldt creates havoc for managers. Consider, once
again, the circumstances of corporate managers in a solvent period who are offered an
opportunity for a LBO that benefits shareholders at the expense of creditors. Managers
facilitating such a transaction would be found to be acting consistent with their fiduciary
duties, if a claim were brought against them outside a bankruptcy proceeding, but
inconsistent with their fiduciary duties, if the claim were brought as part of a bankruptcy
proceedings.
Despite its confusing analysis and sweeping rhetoric, we consider Wieboldt an
early application of the general principle described above, which is that creditors
become the beneficiaries of managers’ fiduciary obligations when the company is
insolvent. Factually this interpretation of Wieboldt is supportable, since the court in its
analysis of the fraudulent transfer claims noted that Weiboldt was allegedly insolvent at
the time of the transaction, and that the LBO resulted in further insolvency.76 Moreover,
fiduciary duty claims such as these are not a creation of bankruptcy law, but are simply
state law claims that are owned by the debtor and, upon filing, become property of the
bankruptcy estate.77 Thus rather than announce a principle of bankruptcy law, Weiboldt
is best understood as a case about state fiduciary duty law that is applicable in periods
of insolvency. Subsequent bankruptcy cases may support this more limited reading of
Weiboldt.78

76

Id. at 502.

77

11 U.S.C. § 541 (2006); Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 448 (1979) (“Property
interests are created and defined by state law. Unless some federal interest requires a different
result, there is no reason why such interests should be analyzed differently simply because an
interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding.”). See also, In re Healthco, 208 B.R. at
300 (“Any Healthco claim is an interest in property which passed to the bankruptcy estate. The
Trustee can bring any suit Healthco could have brought, including suits against directors and
controlling shareholders for breach of fiduciary duty.”),.
78

In Hechinger Inv. Co. of Del. v. Fleet Retail Finance Group, 274 B.R. 71 (D. Del.
2002), fiduciary claims against corporate managers were bought by the Official Committee of
Unsecured Creditors of Hechinger and arose, the Committee claimed, out of a LBO that:
“[S]hifted all of the risk of the Debtors’ operations to their unsecured creditors”
by cashing out [the shareholders] equity interests in Hechinger while incurring on
behalf of Hechinger hundreds of millions of unserviceable secured debt, at a time
when the company was insolvent.
Id. at 75 (quoting amended complaint).
In its discussion of the Committee’s fiduciary duty claim, the court clearly tied its
conclusion, that the defendant’s owed a duty to the creditors to the Committee’s allegation that
Hechinger was insolvent at the time of the LBO. Id. at 90. In fact, the court noted that if the fact
of insolvency were taken as true, “defendants, as directors and controlling shareholders, cannot,
and do not, contend that they do not owe certain fiduciary duties to the unsecured creditors.” Id.
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In all events, however, Wieboldt demonstrates once again the confusion wrought
by courts in this area. The opinion obscures the true nature of the problem, which is a
classic conflict between the interests of shareholders and creditors. The court,
however, confusingly characterizes the duty of managers as running to the
“corporation”, while in fact holding that the duty runs to creditors, all this done with no
explanation as to why the traditional duty to shareholders is not applicable.
D. Duties of Corporate Managers in Bankruptcy Cases
Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code is designed to offer a collective response to
the unique problems financially distressed firms face. As a firm’s financial status
worsens, individual creditors natural incentive is to withdraw their capital – leading to a
race to the courthouse that would, if unchecked, lead to an inefficient liquidation of the
corporate assets.79 Chapter 11 stays individual debt collection actions,80 permits the
In re Healthco Int’l, Inc., 208 B.R. 288 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997), also involved a LBO
that resulted in a bankruptcy just over two years after the closing. Upon Healthco’s bankruptcy
filing, the trustee brought fraudulent transfer and breach of fiduciary duty claims against the
directors.
The defendant-directors challenged the Trustee’s fiduciary duty claim, stating that their
obligations were limited to protecting the shareholders’ interests. The court stated, however,
that where a transaction leaves a corporation insolvent, or brings it to the brink of insolvency,
“the rights of the creditors become paramount.” Id. at 300. In addition, the court stated that
“directors of an insolvent Delaware corporation breach their fiduciary duties to creditors, even in
the absence of formal insolvency proceedings, when they authorize fraudulent conveyances that
cause the corporation to be insolvent in fact. Id., at 301, citing Geyer.
Requiring directors to look out for the interests of creditors as well as stockholders
involves no irreconcilable conflict, as contended by defendants. It is merely an incident
of the fiduciary obligations owed by directors to their corporation. A distribution to
stockholders which renders the corporation insolvent, or leaves it with unreasonably
small capital, threatens the very existence of the corporation. This is prejudicial to all its
constituencies, including creditors, employees, and stockholders retaining an ownership
interest. Surely it is not asking too much of directors that they honor their obligations of
loyalty and care to avoid the corporation's destruction.
Id.
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The seminal article on bankruptcy as a response to collective action problems is
Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain, 91
Yale L.J. 857 (1982); See also, Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and
Bankruptcy: A Reply to Warren, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 815, 827 (1987) .
80

The automatic stay, provided in 11 U.S.C. § 362, prohibits actions to collect debt,
enforce judgments, and exercise control over property of the estate. This provision forces the
parties to operate within the confines of the case. The automatic stay ensures that the prebankruptcy owners will participate in the proceeding by stopping all creditor collection efforts
and interference with property of the state. Because financial problems do not occur overnight,
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continued operation of the business and imposes a structure for collective negotiations
over the future of the firm.81
The initiation of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, thus marks a substantial change
in the way the corporation is governed and, accordingly, a change in the fiduciary duties
of corporate managers.82 Creditor contracts are no longer effective to control inefficient
investment in risky projects desired by shareholders. In place of those contracts,
Chapter 11 substitutes a governance regime that includes creditor representation,
negotiation and default rules regarding the allocation of value in a reorganization plan,
and judicial oversight over most important decisions.83
Under this regime, the law requires managers to fulfill the fiduciary
responsibilities of a trustee to act in the interests of both creditors and shareholders.84
The point of convergence for these naturally opposed constituencies is the value of the
assets, or, in bankruptcy parlance, the “estate.”85 Thus, bankruptcy courts often
the preference provisions of the Code provide a reach back to bring debts paid on the eve of
bankruptcy within the proceeding. These provisions make bankruptcy a truly collective
proceeding in which everyone must participate.
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These negotiations generally revolve around the formation of a plan of reorganization.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (contents of a plan). The plan provides the financial structure of the
reorganized entity as well as other provisions that will govern the company as it emerges from
the protection of the bankruptcy proceedings.
82

Since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, the general rule is that pre-bankruptcy
managers will stay in control of the business through the fictitious entity known as the “debtor in
possession.” 11 U.S.C. § 1101 defines "debtor in possession" as being the "debtor" unless a
trustee has been appointed. The "debtor" is the entity that is the subject of the bankruptcy case.
11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (1988). For most purposes, the debtor in possession can be regarded simply
as the pre-bankruptcy corporation with special rights and obligations under the Bankruptcy
Code. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984); Raymond T. Nimmer &
Richard B. Feinberg, Chapter 11 Business Governance: Fiduciary Duties, Business Judgment,
Trustees and Exclusivity, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. 1, 20- 37(1989).
83

See Christopher W. Frost, The Theory, Reality and Pragmatism of Corporate
Governance in Bankruptcy, 72 Am. Bankr. L. Rev. 103 (1998).
84

See Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343, 355-56
(1985) (“the fiduciary duty of the trustee runs to shareholders as well as to creditors”). In re
Schepps Food Store, 160 B.R. 792, 797 (“A trustee's constituency. . . is broadened under the
Code to include not only the debtor and its shareholders, but also all of the debtor's creditors.”)
85

See In re Big Rivers Electric Corp., 233 B.R. 726, 734-35 (Bkrtcy, W.D. Ky. 1998) (“It
is beyond dispute that a Chapter 11 DIP owes a fiduciary duty to all of the creditors and other
interest holders of its bankruptcy estate to maximize the value of the bankruptcy estate.”);
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articulate the duty as one to maximize the value of the estate, rather than to benefit a
particular group of claimants.86
Like non-bankruptcy courts’ references to the “corporate enterprise” and
“community of interests,”87 bankruptcy courts’ reference to the estate may promote
confusion regarding the beneficiaries of managerial duties in bankruptcy. Under the
Bankruptcy Code, the term “estate” refers to all of the pre-bankruptcy corporation’s
property and interests in property.88 Thus, at its simplest level, the duty to maximize the
estate equates to a duty to maximize the value of all of the corporations assets for the
benefit of shareholders and creditors as a whole, without regard to the distributional
outcome. Employees and other non-investor constituencies may benefit from decisions
in the bankruptcy process but the Bankruptcy Code does not require, or perhaps even
permit, the bankruptcy judge to consider the effect of managerial decisions on these
constituencies.89
The Seventh Circuit’s analysis in Matter of Central Ice Cream90 provides an
illustration of managers’ duties in Chapter 11. In that case, shareholders of the debtor
appealed an order of the bankruptcy court approving a settlement of litigation between
the debtor and a third party. The creditors favored the settlement because it was
sufficient to pay their claims in full. The district court affirmed the order and sanctioned
two of the shareholders for challenging the settlement. In its order approving the
settlement the bankruptcy court made clear that it was guided by the best interests of
the creditors, stating:
To seek greater return for the shareholders at risk to the creditors
would be most unfair. A creditor supplies to a business in return for
getting paid an agreed price. A stockholder puts up risk capital as
an investment. The creditor's interest is given major consideration
because it is fair that creditors who expected and deserved no risk
LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. Perelman, 82 F.Supp. 2d 279, 293 (D. Del. 2000)(“Officers and directors
should have broad latitude to balance competing interests in a bankruptcy case in order to make
decisions that are in the best interests of the estate.”)
86

See In re Central Ice Cream, 836 F.2d 1068 , 1072 (7th Cir. 1988) (trustees duty is “to
maximize the value of the estate, not of a particular group of claimants”).
87

See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
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11 U.S.C. § 541(a).

89

See Christopher W. Frost, Bankruptcy Redistributive Policies and the Limits of the
Judicial Process, 74 N. CAR. L. REV. 75 (1995) ( hereinafter, Frost, Bankruptcy Redistributive
Policies).
90

836 F.2d at 1068.
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should not now risk losing all in an effort to recover more for
investors.91
In analyzing the trustee’s claim for sanctions, the Seventh Circuit found that the
bankruptcy court’s analysis of the settlement and of the duty of the trustee to protect the
creditors’ interests fell wide of the mark. Rather than protect the creditors from all risk of
loss, the court stated, the trustee was under a duty to maximize the value of the estate.
What the court recognized is that, once they were assured that their claims were paid in
full, creditors had no incentive to continue to pursue the litigation regardless of the
expected value of that option. While it was true that a continued pursuit of the litigation
would expose creditors to risk, the risk was parallel to the risk creditors face outside of
bankruptcy.92
The Central Ice Cream court thus recognized that neither creditor-focused duties
nor shareholder-focused duties, will necessarily lead to decisions that maximize the
value of the firm as a whole. Shareholders, because they do not bear the full cost of an
incorrect decision, would be more inclined to roll the dice in the hope of a jackpot
recovery. Creditors, on the other hand, naturally favor any disposition that would result
in payment in full, regardless of whether that disposition maximizes the value of the
assets. Because the normal contractual processes that mediate these inefficient
incentives are restricted in Chapter 11, courts seek to reach the efficient result directly.93
91

836 F.2d at 1072, quoting In re Central Ice Cream, 59 B.R. 476, 487 (Bankr, N.D. Ill.

1985).
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93

Id. at 1072.

Although a close examination of the bankruptcy process leads to the conclusion that
managers should focus on the maximization of asset value, courts occasionally employ rhetoric
that suggests a more creditor-focused duty. For example, where a firm is clearly insolvent,
courts often state that the interests of shareholders must be subordinated to the interests of
creditors. CFTC v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 355. This statement does not mean, however, that
the courts are employing a creditor maximization principal. Instead, the subordination of
shareholder interests in insolvent estates is entirely consistent with the norm of firm value
maximization. Requiring managers to consider the interests of out of the money shareholders
would lead an overinvestment in risky projects (such as the continuation of a business that would
have more value in liquidation) that would be fundamentally inconsistent with value
maximization. Courts that formulate the duty as one owed to both shareholders and creditors are
then left to explain why shareholder interests and desires in clearly insolvent corporations are
disregarded. See id. (“In cases in which it is clear that the estate is not large enough to cover any
shareholder claims, the trustee’s exercise of the corporation’s attorney-client privilege will
benefit only creditors, but there is nothing anomalous in this result; rather it is in keeping with
the hierarchy of interests created by the bankruptcy laws.”)
A related area of confusion arises where managers take actions in bankruptcy cases that
are designed to increase shareholder returns solely at the expense of creditor returns. Tenn-Fla
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The duty to maximize the value of the estate is built into the structure and
purpose of the bankruptcy process. Chapter 11 is premised on the idea that a
negotiated resolution of financial distress will lead to value maximizing decisions
regarding the assets of the firm. To further this idea, the Code provides a forum for
collective negotiation which makes possible the capture of going concern value that
might otherwise be lost in a liquidation.94 Throughout the process, the push and pull of
shareholders and creditors is evident as the parties and the bankruptcy judge wrestle
with such questions as whether and when to sell assets, to assume or reject executory
contracts, to settle claims, and, perhaps most importantly, to appoint a trustee or
convert the case to a liquidation under Chapter 7. Most of the bankruptcy decisions on
these types of issues depict a bankruptcy judge who is aware of the differing incentives
of shareholders and creditors and who seeks a decisions that will maximize the value of
the assets.
III. PRESCRIPTION
Our positive conclusions are that, outside of the bankruptcy context, Delaware
law generally obligates corporate managers in normal periods to act in the best interests
of shareholders, in the vicinity of insolvency to act in the best interests of the corporation
as a whole, and in insolvency to act in the best interests of creditors.
We find this regime to be ambiguous, confusing and inefficient and urge
Delaware courts to reconsider the matter. We also strongly urge other states to reject
this regime. The regime is in our minds an example of the all too frequent the mess that
Delaware courts make of fiduciary duties.
The rule that managers must act in the best interests of shareholders and that
non-shareholders must rely on contract for their protections generally leads to efficient
Partners v. First Union National Bank, 229 B.R. 720 (W.D. Tenn. 1999) provides an example. In
that case, the debtor’s managers failed to disclose several pre-confirmation bids for the assets of
the partnership, an apartment property. The creditors complained that the debtors managers held
off several bidders on the property during negotiations that resulted in a plan of reorganization.
After a plan was confirmed that resulted in a 75% recovery to the secured bondholders, the
debtor sold the property for almost $12.5 million, an amount that would have resulted in the
bondholders being paid in full. Id. at 736. By failing to disclose the interest of the buyers, the
debtor succeeded in reducing the creditors claims and to recover the 25% reduction for the equity
holders.
The debtor attempted to justify its actions by claiming that, as debtor in possession, it
owed a duty to both creditors and equity holders and that its actions were an attempt to recognize
both of those interests. The court made short work of this argument, stating, “Even ignoring
TFP’s failure to account for its fiduciary duty to the court, the court finds that TFP’s failure to
maximize the value of the estate was a breach of its fiduciary duty.” Id.
94

See Christopher W. Frost, Running the Asylum: Governance Problems in Bankruptcy
Reorganizations, 34 Ariz. L. Rev. 89 (1992).
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outcomes. It seems likely that if shareholders (owners) and managers (agents) were
able to bargain with one another the shareholders would be willing to purchase some
level of fairness and due care from their managers. Non-shareholder constituencies in
most cases can be expected either to price the risk that managers’ actions may be
deleterious to their best interests or mitigate or eliminate such risks through contract
provisions.
The filing of a bankruptcy petition, however, prompts a change in the legal
landscape that makes a shift in fiduciary duties appropriate. The automatic stay that the
Bankruptcy Code imposes effectively precludes the normal contractual remedies that
operate under non-bankruptcy law. The right to declare a breach and withdraw capital
from a corporation when managers violate contractual protections is anathema to the
collective nature of the bankruptcy process. In place of those remedies, the Chapter 11
process substitutes a system of managerial duties to the “estate,” specific voting rights,
creditor representation, judicial supervision, and judicial approval of specific managerial
decisions to control the behavior of managers.
Bankruptcy also has the benefit of providing a bright line standard for the shift in
managers’ duties that the credit markets need to price risk efficiently. Prior to
bankruptcy, under Delaware law, shareholders, lenders and others cannot determine
ex-ante when a shift in duty might arise. As a consequence, these constituencies never
know precisely when managers will be permitted, or required, to look out for their
interests. As a consequence, creditors may undervalue the protection Delaware law
provides, while shareholders may over-estimate the cost that creditor protection
imposes on them. Shifting duties only on bankruptcy provides clarity that should
increase efficiency in pricing.
This section offers a closer look at the justifications underlying the shareholder
wealth maximization principle and develops the argument against the approach the
Delaware courts have taken to fiduciary duties as corporations approach and enter a
state of insolvency.
A.

The Normative Justifications for Shareholder Wealth Maximization

As stated earlier, the shareholder wealth maximization norm underlying corporate
governance has a long history in corporate law and is the dominant approach used by
courts. In most cases we believe that, shareholder wealth maximization leads to
efficient results. We recognize, however, that some scholars have attacked shareholder
wealth maximization normatively – arguing that it is not an attractive goal – and
positively – arguing that it does not adequately describe today’s law.95
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See authorities cited supra notes 1,6,19 and 21.
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This article does not make a strong claim that shareholder wealth maximization is
the best or even the most efficient approach to corporate governance issues.96 Instead
we take the model as a given and focus principally on the effect that a shift in fiduciary
duties has on the financial markets and the parties ability to price risk. Notwithstanding
this focus, some understanding of the normative underpinnings of the shareholder
wealth maximization principle is necessary to an understanding of the reasons for and
against shifting those duties.
1.

Criterion for efficiency analyses of corporate governance regimes.

The basic criterion for analysis of the efficiency of any corporate law or regulation
is whether the law or regulation in question tends to lead the parties to maximize the
value of the corporate enterprise. From this starting point, corporate law makes the
general assumption that the parties with capital and other inputs to the corporation have
the proper set of incentives to bargain for the governance regime that maximizes the
overall value of the corporate enterprise. Rather than directly regulate corporate
actions, therefore, corporate law generally establishes a set mandatory and default
rules that may be explained as mimicking the bargain fully informed and rational parties
would choose for themselves.97
2.

Shareholder Wealth Maximization and the Efficiency Criteria.

The shareholder wealth maximization criterion underlying corporate governance
takes its normative basis from the idea that the equity ownership in the firm stands as a
market-based proxy for societal wealth maximization, because shareholders hold the
residual claim on the firm’s assets. When a firm is solvent, and is likely to remain
solvent, shareholders’ gains and losses are usually in lockstep with the value of the firm.
Thus when the firm’s managers maximize shareholder gains, they are also maximizing
96

The authors are not in complete agreement on the question. Campbell has argued in
favor of expanding the beneficiaries of corporate managers’ fiduciary duties to include nonshareholder constituencies. See, e.g., Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Corporate Fiduciary
Principles for the Post-Contractarian Era, 23 Fla. State. L. Rev. 561 (1996). Frost believes that
the judicial decision making process is not well suited to evaluate managers’ decision making on
the basis of corporate wealth maximization or any other regime that requires a court to balance
the benefits and losses a particular decision imposes on diverse constituencies. Accordingly,
Frost favors a regime that points managers in one clear direction with a robust regulatory and
contract regime that provides specific protection to other constituencies. See, e.g., Frost,
Bankruptcy Redistributive Policies, supra note 89.
97

See Gregory Scott Crespi, Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary Duties: The Inefficiency of
the Shareholder Primacy Norm, 55 S.M.U. L. Rev. 141, 142 (2002) (Professor Crespi
approaches the efficiency question by asking, “[W]hich assignment of duties . . . more closely
replicates the jointly wealth-maximizing structure of rights and duties to which rational
bargainers establishing a corporation would agree to in costless negotiations?”).
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the value of the assets under their control. Fiduciary duties therefore serve the purpose
of focusing discretionary managerial decision making on maximizing asset value.98 On
this view, fiduciary duties are “gap fillers” in the relationship between shareholders, as
owners of the corporations assets, and managers – reducing the transaction costs and
agency problems inherent in the separation of ownership from control.99
The presence of corporate debt and the accompanying possibility of insolvency
skews corporate incentives away from the close relationships between the wealth of the
financial investors and the value of the firm, however. Once a corporation issues debt,
shareholders have an incentive to overinvest in risky projects, while creditors have an
incentive to avoid risk.100 Because shareholders, as residual claimants, share the risk
of loss with creditors but reap the gains from success, they have an appetite for risk that
increases with leverage. Concomitantly, creditors, who bear some of the risk of loss but
do not share in gains, would prefer reduced risk. Both shareholders’ and creditors’
incentives may differ from the investment approach that would maximize the value of
the firm.101
The conflict is further exacerbated when we take into account the fact that
financial investors are not the only stakeholders interested in corporate decisionmaking. Employees, customers and the surrounding community all contribute to the
societal benefits of the corporate form and are all affected by managerial decision
making. These stakeholder groups hold incentives that differ from financial investors,
and some scholars have argued forcefully that managers should be permitted to take
their interests into account when making decisions on behalf of the corporation.102
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See Laura Lin, supra note 48 at 1485 (“[R]equiring directors to maximize shareholder
interest provides a fairly accurate benchmark for maximizing the long-term, wealth-producing
capacity of the firm.”).
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Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making
Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV.
23, 26-29 (1991); Crespi, supra note 97 at 141-42 (“Many situations arise where the proper
choices to be made by corporate officials are not completely determined by [contracts between
financial claimants and the corporation]. There is an obvious need for courts to impose some
principle of accountability to guide those officials in their exercise of the often substantial
discretion left to them by their incomplete instructions . . .”).
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See Barondes, supra note 59 at 49 (1998) (The theory of the corporate enterprise has
long recognized that conflicting incentives are created when a corporation issues debt.”).
101

Lin, supra note 48 at 1496 (“neither shareholders nor creditors have the incentive to
maximize the value of the insolvent firm”);
102

See supra notes 19 and 21.
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One way of resolving these conflicts is to require managers to maximize the
value of corporate assets under their control for the benefit of all interested parties.
Several corporate law commentators have argued that corporate value maximization
should be the standard by which courts should judge managerial decision-making.103
The normative appeal of this approach is evident upon review of the basic criterion for
wealth maximization. The goal is to maximize societal wealth and, to the extent no
single investor group holds a set of incentives that is consistent with that goal, direct
regulation of managerial activities to achieve the goal may be appropriate.
In large part, however, corporate law and commentary has resisted this
approach. Instead, the mismatch of incentives among stakeholders is mediated through
a nexus of contracts that requires non-shareholder constituencies to fix the parameters
of managerial decision-making. Creditors, employees and other interested stakeholders
negotiate for specific protection through contract and are further protected through
similarly specific laws and regulations.104 These protections,105 along with the
protections provided by fraudulent transfer laws,106 set the boundaries for managerial
discretion within which managers act for the benefit of shareholders.107
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See Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional
Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 214 (1999) (arguing that rational investors
holding diversified portfolios would agree to a rule that requires managers to maximize the value
of the corporation, rather than any particular class of claimants); Crespi, supra note 97 at 152153 (concluding that the locus of corporate officials’ fiduciary duty should be the corporation,
rather than shareholders).
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See infra notes 131-132 and accompanying text.

105

See Crespi, supra note 97 at 141 (noting the conventional view that “[w]hen corporate
directors and officers . . . make decisions within the remaining zone of discretion, whose
boundaries are defined by these contractual provisions, they are regarded as subject to a fiduciary
duty to maximize shareholder wealth.”).
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107

See supra note 24 and accompanying text.

Proponents of shareholder wealth maximization advance a range of justifications for
the approach. Bainbridge, for example, focuses on the “two masters” problem, which posits that
a fiduciary serving two masters cannot make principled trade-offs between the two, and the
“managerial sin” problem, under which a fiduciary with two masters can play the masters off of
one another to the fiduciaries benefit. Stephen N. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder
Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1423, 143538 (1993); see also Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C.L. REV.
595 (1997). Macey focuses on the cost of contracting, noting that shareholders are the parties
most in need of, and willing to pay for, the benefits of fiduciary duties. See Macey, supra note
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Considered as a whole, these fiduciary rules that are applicable in normal or
solvent periods usually provide incentives for efficient outcomes. The obligation of
corporate managers to maximize the total wealth of the company’s shareholders
creates an incentive for managers to make efficient investments – in technology, for
example – as a way to enhance the profit of the owners of the company. Similarly, a
rule that discourages wealth transfers detrimental to shareholders is also efficient.
Wealth transfer transactions do not necessarily improve allocative efficiency but do
involve transaction costs. For those reasons, such wealth transfer transactions are
generally inefficient as an economic matter.108
Although generally efficient, these fiduciary rules provide incentive for inefficient
conduct in some cases. Denying other corporate constituencies – perhaps most
apparently, creditors – the benefit of fiduciary duty protections may provide managers
an incentive to construct inefficient transactions.

99 at 36-39 (arguing that shareholders are the group that most needs the gap-filling protection
that fiduciary duties provides).
108

Returning to an example loosely based on Weinberger v. UOP, 457 A. 2d. 701 (Del.
1983), assume that a merger of majority owned subsidiary into its parent creates no efficiencies
but, instead, is driven only by the transfer wealth from minority shareholders to majority
shareholders. That transaction does no improve allocative efficiency but does involve
transaction costs. It is, therefore, an inefficient transaction as an economic matter. On economic
grounds, such transactions should be discouraged. Under another approach, some may also wish
to discourage such transactions on the grounds of unfairness, since such wealth transfer
transactions generate uncompensated losers (e.g., minority shareholders are not compensated for
losses they suffer in the value of their investments).
Even when wealth transfers are imbedded in transactions that otherwise move assets into
hands that are more efficient, allowing such transaction may nonetheless create incentives for
inefficient outcomes. Consider the following example. Imagine that Target Co.’s common
stock is selling for $10 and that Aggressor A and Aggressor B are bidding for Target’s stock.
Aggressor A values Target’s net assets at $15 and the opportunity to expropriate value from
other constituencies at $10. Aggressor B values Target’s net assets at $18 but is unable or
unwilling to expropriate any value from other constituencies, and thus values that opportunity at
$0. Aggressor A, who values Target’s assets less, will likely be the successful bidder for
Target’s stock, since it can pay up to $25, while Aggressor B, the one who values the net assets
most, can pay only $18. The outcome is once again inefficient.
Accordingly, today’s corporate fiduciary rules, which condemn the managerial
facilitation of wealth transfer transactions without regard to whether total shareholder value as a
whole is increased, are sound.
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An extreme example of an incentive for an inefficient transaction can be built on
the basic facts of the old Keebler case.109 K is the 100% shareholder of M Corp., which
has a significant amount of debentures outstanding. K sells all its M Corp. stock to A
Corp., which then loots the assets of M Corp., thus rendering M Corp. unable to meet its
obligation to its debentureholders. The claim in Keebler was that K, the selling
shareholder, breached a fiduciary duty to its debentureholders by failing to investigate
the bona fides of the purchaser, A Corp.110 To deny creditors – here, debentureholders
– fiduciary duty protection in such a case may provide an incentive for the sole
shareholder to sell to an inefficient looter. A looter may be able to pay the highest price
for the company, even though the looter is not the most efficient utilizer of the
company’s assets, because the looter can recognize the value of the owner’s interest in
the assets and expropriate creditors’ interests by theft.111
A less extreme and more typical example of situations in which today’s fiduciary
duty rules provide an incentive for an inefficient transaction involves a highly leveraged
acquisition of the type described earlier.112 The power of shareholders to expropriate
value from other constituencies – most apparently, creditors – can provide a powerful
incentive for transactions that do not improve allocative efficiency.113
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Swinney v. Keebler Company, 329 F. Supp. 216 (D. S.C. 1971), reversed on other
grounds 480 F. 2d 573 (4th Cir. 1973).
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This District Court in Keebler held that Keebler violated a fiduciary duty owed to
debentureholders by selling to a corporate looter. Id., at 224. While one is able to find other
examples of cases in which courts extend fiduciary or fiduciary-like protections to creditors, such
cases should be considered aberrations of the widely held view that no fiduciary duty is owed by
corporate managers to the corporation’s creditors. See supra notes 5 and 20 and accompanying
text.
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An example may be helpful. Assume that M Corp. in the hands K of has assets with a
total value of $100, represented by $50 in debentures and $50 in market value stock. The most
efficient legitimate bidder may value the assets at $110 and thus be willing to pay $60 for K’s
stock. An inefficient looter, however, may be able to bid $70 for K’s stock, since the looter
intends to steal all of M Corp.’s assets and sell them for $80.
112
113

See the discussion in notes 25-27 and accompanying text, supra.

Assume that the value of Target’s assets in the hands of its old managers amounts to
$100, which represents $50 equity and $50 in debt. A transaction in which the assets are moved
into the hands of less efficient managers – assume the new managers can only manage the assets
in a way the generates value of $90 – can nonetheless benefit the equity owners, if, for example,
the value of their interests go to $60 and the value of creditors’ interests go to $30. If managers’
interests are aligned with the owners’, managers have an incentive to facilitate this inefficient
transaction.
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Beyond the possible allocative inefficiency that can result from such highly
leveraged acquisitions and spin offs,114 such transactions may raise distributive, or
fairness, issues in the minds of some. Redistributing creditor wealth to shareholders –
even if accompanied by improved allocative efficiency – may seem unfair and
distasteful to many and thus not the type of transaction that society should sanction.
Creditors, however, are not without protections from such expropriative
transactions. Fraudulent conveyance statutes, for example, protect creditors.115
Creditors also can protect themselves by ex ante contract. A poison put that is
triggered by a significant increase in the company’s debt is an example of such a
protective provision. Alternatively, of course, creditors can extract ex ante
compensation for the risk by demanding a higher interest rate to pay them for the
possibility of future losses due to an increase in the company’s debt.
High transaction costs, however, may create a seam within which it is impossible
for some creditors to protect themselves by contract. Small or involuntary corporate
creditors are perhaps the best examples of corporate constituencies unable to protect
themselves by ex ante contract from expropriative moves by shareholders and
corporate managers.116
Although structured as a spin off, the reorganization of Marriot in the 1990s provides and
example a transaction that may have been driven solely by expropriation and thus was not
efficient. In the reorgainzation, Marriot split itself into two separate companies. One of the new
companies owned its profitable hotel management business. The other retained Marriot’s real
property and its debt. When the reorganization was announced, the value of the stock of Marriot
increased significantly, and the value of its bonds decreased significantly. Bondholders in total,
however, apparently lost more than shareholders in total gained. For an excellent short
description of the Marriot transaction see William W. Bratton, CORPORATE FINANCE CASES AND
MATERIALS 238 (5th ed. 2003)(“According to Parrino, Spinoffs and Wealth Transfers: The
Marriott Case, 43 J. Fin. Econ. 241 (1997), the bondholders losses incident to the Marriot spin
off were not . . . equaled . . . by stockholder gains.”).
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See the description of the transactions in note 26, supra.
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See Unif. Fradulent Transfer Act, 7A U.L.A. 643 (1984): 11 U.S.C. Sec. 548 (2005).
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See Jonathan C. Lipson, Directors’ Duties to Creditors; Power Imbalance and the
Financially Distressed Corporation, 50 UCLA Law Rec. 1189 (2003). The author argues that
creditors that have “volition, cognition, and exit . . . should be limited to the contractual rights
they have (probably laboriously) negotiated.” Id., at 1193. He identifies other creditors with
“low levels of volition, cognition and exit . . . [that] should benefit from some sort of fiduciary
duty from directors in the distressed corporation . . . .” He identifies these creditors as “tort
creditors”, “certain terminated employees,” “taxing authorities” and “certain trade creditors.”
Id., at 1245.
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Today’s fiduciary duties, which deny fiduciary protections to creditors, may be
understood to represent a decision by society that, on balance, the risk of inefficient and
expropriative transactions are best handled by contract and discrete societal rules, such
as the rules that forbids fraudulent conveyances. While some may not agree with that
determination and consequently argue that the seam described in the immediately
preceding paragraph is broad and thus capable of generating significant amounts of
inefficient and expropriative conduct, the clear and long standing rule of society that is
manifested in such decisions as Metropolitan Life117 and Katz118 is that the best way to
deal with the risk is by contract and discrete rules. In economic terms, society seems to
believe that the benefits from any remedy of the problem are less the costs of the
remedy.
While a normative debate over the proper approach continues, positive corporate
law seems squarely focused on shareholder wealth as the predominant goal of fiduciary
duties.119 As described above, inefficient transactions and uncompensated losses are
possible within this regime, but society seemingly has determined that the regime is
acceptable.120 One might describe this as a determination that the cost of eliminating
the possible inefficient and unfair transactions exceeds the benefits from eliminating the
transactions. In short, society seems satisfied that fiduciary duties are efficient for
shareholders and managers and that non-shareholder constituencies are efficiently able
to construct and price the protections that they desire or need by contractual provisions.
B.

Fiduciary Duties In and Near Insolvency.

As discussed in Section II, courts have applied a confusing array of standards to
judge the behavior of managers of insolvent or nearly insolvent firms. The following
discussion examines and challenges the normative underpinnings for the shift of duty
upon financial distress and makes the case for maintaining the shareholder wealth
maximization norm throughout the decline of the corporation until the point at which a
Chapter 11 case is instituted.
1.
Normative Justifications for the Shift of Duty upon and in the Vicinity
of Insolvency.
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Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. JRJ Nabisco, Inc. 716 F. Supp. 1504
(D.D.N.Y. 1989).
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Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A. 2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986).
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See supra notes 17-38 and accompanying text.
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See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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The normative case for shifting the focus of managers’ fiduciary duties away from
shareholders and toward the corporation or creditors upon or near insolvency rests on a
claim that the deterioration of the company’s financial status enhances the incentives,
and the power, of shareholders to expropriate value from creditors.121 In its simplest
form, this claim is based on the notion that insolvency marks a shift in residual
claimants. The standard story posits that upon insolvency, shareholders lose their
economic stake in the enterprise and therefore no longer place money at stake in the
business decisions. Creditors, on the other hand, now occupy the residual claimant
position and therefore hold the correct set of incentives to maximize the value of the
business.122
At first blush, a fiduciary duty regime that adjusts as the corporation passes from
financial health to financial distress makes some sense. The vicinity of insolvency
cases are grounded on the idea that insolvency is not a singular event that suddenly
marks a change in the incentives of the investors. Corporations are not solvent one
moment and insolvent the next. Instead, corporations slide toward and into insolvency
over time.123 To the extent that shareholder wealth maximization is justifiable because
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See Barondes, supra note 59 at 49 (“The theory [of the corporate enterprise] predicts
that when a corporation is insolvent or on the verge of insolvency, the incentive to pursue risky
investment strategies may increase.”); Lin supra, note 48 at 1489 (“When the corporation is
insolvent or at the brink of insolvency, the difference in risk preference between shareholders
and creditors is magnified with respect to corporate investment policies. During this period of
financial stress, shareholders favor highly risky projects, even if thoese projects have only a
slight chance of generating income large enough to cover the firm’s debt and still provide some
return to shareholders.”).
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Lipson, supra note 116 at 1192, characterizes the standard account of fiduciary
duties as follows, “As the corporation becomes financially distressed, creditors become its
residual claimants, and are in a sense subrogated to the rights and privileges of shareholders, who
no longer have an economic stake in the corporation.” See also, Steven Schwarcz, Rethinking a
Corporation’s Obligation to Creditors, 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 647,667 (“Creditors of an insolvent
corporation, however, not only have a senior right to repayment but they also now have the right,
traditionally associated with ownership, to the "upside" in value of the corporate debtor's assets,
at least until the corporation regains solvency. This right is similar to a shareholder's right to the
equity of a solvent corporation: in economic terms, the creditors have now become the primary
residual claimants.”) But see Lin, supra note 48 at 1498 (noting that upon or near insolvency,
“creditors want management to preserve the assets available to satisfy their claims by investing
conservatively and taking minimal risk.”).
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See Ramesh K.S. Rao, David Simon Sokolow and Derek White, Fiduciary Duty a la
Lyonnais: An Economic Perspective on Corporate Governance in a Financially-Distressed
Firm, 22 J. Corp. L. 53, 72 (1996) (“The fundamental source of creditor weakness for the
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shareholders hold the residual claims, the erosion of that residual position would seem
correspondingly to erode the justification. One might view solvency and insolvency as
two ends of a spectrum with the duty sliding from one constituency to another as the
corporation moves along the spectrum.124
2.

Critique of the Shift in Duties

Such a justification for the shift in the fiduciary rule applicable in the normal
period is, however, highly problematic, since the bases that support the normal rule of
denying creditors fiduciary duty protection do not change when a company enters
insolvency. Fundamentally, creditors both in and outside insolvent periods have the
same risks and have the same tools at their disposal to deal with the risk.
As the following discussion illustrates, the incentives of shareholders and creditors do
not undergo a radical shift as a corporations financial status deteriorates. While
conflicts may intensify, the ex-ante bargains struck prior to insolvency remain effective
to counteract the desire of shareholders to increase risk. In addition, shifting and then
re-shifting the beneficiaries of corporate managers’ fiduciary duties as the corporation
moves from solvency into the vicinity of insolvency, and then into actual insolvency,
creates a lack of clarity that has pernicious effects on the ability of all parties to bargain
for, price and enforce specific contractual protections.
To the extent shareholder wealth maximization makes sense in normal periods,
the underlying efficiency justification for the regime does not change prior to the point of
bankruptcy. The principal risk for creditors in both normal and insolvent periods is
expropriation. The risk is that shareholders, through their managers, will construct
transactions that transfer wealth from creditors to shareholders. In both periods,
shareholders have an economic incentive and, if left unchecked, the wherewithal to
construct such transactions that benefit shareholders at the expense of creditors.125
financially-distressed firm is the increasing risk creditors bear as the firm slides toward
insolvency.”).
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See Rao, Sokolow and White, supra note 123 at 75 (describing fiduciary duties, and
the legal liability resulting therefrom as shifting from shareholders to creditors as the firms
financial condition worsens); Andrew D. Schaffer, Corporate Fiduciary – Insolvent: The
Fiduciary Relationship your Corporate Law Professor (should have) Warned you About, 8 Am.
Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 479, 542 (“[W]hen a corporation nears insolvency . . . a director/officer
ought to start thinking more conservatively”).
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One way to show this is through examples in which assets of corporations are redeployed in a more risky fashion. Assume, first, that in a normal or solvent period that the assets
of a firm worth 200 and that the creditors’ claims are 100 and the value of the firm’s
shareholders’ interests is 100. Assume that the firm is able to reinvest all its assets in a project
that has a 50% chance of recognizing value of 400 and a 50% chance of recognizing value of 0.
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Thomas Smith has convincingly demonstrated that the presence of debt in a
capital structure always carries with it a mismatch of incentives between shareholders
and creditors that may, depending on the available investments, lead managers to
maximize shareholder wealth at the expense of creditors. In fact, given an investment
opportunity of sufficient risk, Smith asserts that, even in solvent firms, shareholder
wealth maximization might result in inefficient investments that maximize the value of
the shareholders’ interests while reducing the overall value of the corporation.126 Thus,

Although the expected value of the firm is unchanged – 200 – the values of the equity and debt
are both affected. Under the re-deployment, the value of the equity has increased to 150. That
consists of a 50% probability of that shareholders will recognize 300 (400 total value, minus the
100 prior creditors’ claim), or 150, plus a 50% probability of that shareholders will recognize 0.
The value of the creditors’ instruments under the re-deployment, however, have decreased in
value to only 50. Creditors have a 50% chance of 100 (their total claim will be paid if the value
of the firm goes to 400), or 50, plus a 50% chance of 0. (To simplify the example, I am ignoring
the fact that the market may value the re-deployed assets at less than 200, due to the increase in
volatility risk. If the volatility is due entirely to risk that is unique to the firm, however, some
would argue that the market would not demand a premium (or at least not much of a premium)
for the increased volatility, since an investor can cheaply eliminate the volatility by holding a
diversified investment portfolio. See Richard A. Brealey and Steward C. Myers, PRINCIPLES OF
CORPORATE FINANCE 141-237 (5th ed. 1996) (discussing risk, the capital asset pricing model and
criticism of CAPM). Even if the market sets a value of the redeployed assets at less than 200,
however, the point is still made, albeit with somewhat more complicated math.)
This same risk of expropriation of creditor value through asset redeployment exists in a
period of corporate insolvency. Assume now that the assets of an insolvent firm are invested in a
manner that generates a value of a value of 100, that creditors claims amount to 100 and the
value of the firm’s shareholders’ interests is 0. Assume that the firm reinvests its asset in a
project with a 50% chance of amounting to 200 in value and 50% chance of amounting to 0.
Although the total value of the firm remains at 100 following the re-deployment of the assets,
creditor value decreases from 100 to 50, while shareholders’ value increases from 0 to 50.
Creditors value may be described as a 50% probability of recognizing 100 and a 50% probability
of recognizing 0. Shareholders value may be described as a 50% chance of recognizing 100 (200
less the 100 in creditors’ claims) and a 50% chance of recognizing 0.
These rather tedious examples demonstrate that in both insolvency and normal periods,
shareholders and their surrogates – corporate managers – have fundamentally the same economic
incentives to engage in transactions that expropriate creditor value.
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Smith, supra note 103 at 221-23; see also Campbell, A Positive Analysis, supra note 1
at 460-69 (demonstrating that in solvent periods gains by shareholders can result from either
increased efficiencies, expropriation, or both).
38

as Smith shows, the basic problem that Chancellor Allen confronted in Credit Lyonnais
affects all corporations. The question is simply a matter of degree.127
Although Smith’s project is to challenge the efficiency of the shareholder wealth
maximization norm in solvent companies, his conclusions also support the idea that
financial distress does not provide a justification to change the status quo. In fact,
history may even suggest that creditors are actually more vulnerable to wealth transfer
transactions in normal or solvent periods than they are in periods of insolvency, making
it somewhat ironic that courts would choose to enhance creditor protection in periods of
insolvency. One may recall, in that regard, that the most notorious and seemingly the
largest concentration of expropriation of creditor wealth seemed to occur outside of
insolvent periods. Specifically we refer to the expropriation of shareholder wealth that
occurred in the highly leveraged acquisitions of the 1980s. Notwithstanding the number
of such expropriative transactions128 and the staggeringly large estimates of the total
value of creditors’ losses in such transactions,129 society chose not to imposes fiduciary
duties running in favor of creditors injured by such transactions but chose instead to
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In Smith’s view, the incentive for shareholders of distressed firms to make
investments that are socially inefficient “has to do with the firm being in the vicinity of only in a
trivial sense. It is just that the closer to insolvency a firm is, the less risky a bet has to be for its
loss to push the firm into bankruptcy. Id. See also Crespi, supra note 97 at 147 (investments
outside of the vicinity of insolvency “can also result in expected shareholder wealth effects that
diverge from expected corporation wealth effects.”).
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See, e.g., Thomas R. Hurst & Larry G. McGuinness, The Corporation, The
Bondholder and Fiduciary Duties, 10 J. L. & Com. 187, 190, n. 14 (1991) (reporting that
between 1984 and 1989, 230 companies were involved in transactions that resulted in
downgrading of credit rating). See also, Marcel Kahan & Michael Klauser, Antitakeover
Provisions in Bonds: Bondholder Protection or Management Entrenchment?, 40 UCLA L. Rev.
931, 933, n.2 (1993) (reporting that from 1984 though 1988, 183 companies lost value in their
bonds due to acquisitions or LBOs).
129

See Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J. Corp. L. 205. 206
(1988) (referring to bondholder losses during this period as “possibly the largest expropriation of
investors in American business history.”). See also Kahan & Klauser, supra note 128, at 933
(describing acquisitions and LBOs of the period as transforming “blue-chip bonds valued in the
tens of billions of dollars into speculative-grade ‘junk’”). The RJR Nabisco acquisition alone
was estimated to create $40 million in bondholder losses. James Sterngold, Kohlberg Leads
Latest Nabisco Bids, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1988, at D1. On the RJR acquisition, see generally
Deborah A. DeMott, Introduction – The Biggest Deal Ever, 1989 Duke L.J. 1.
39

continue to expect creditors during normal periods to bargain for their own
protections.130
In addition, creditors have the same tool available to protect themselves from
such transactions, whether the transactions occur in the normal period or the period of
insolvency. The protective tool is ex ante contract, and creditors can use it with equal
effectiveness against transactions in either period. Well crafted financial covenants in
debt instruments can accomplish two goals. First, they can prohibit transactions that
unduly increase the risk that the corporation will become insolvent in the first instance.
Negative covenants prohibiting dividends, additional debt, substantial capital acquisition
or divestiture or a change in business may restrict managers who seek to increase the
risk creditors of a solvent business face. In addition, financial covenants may also
define default in a way that permits creditors to exercise default and acceleration rights
upon the corporations failure to meet certain financial targets. Net worth covenants, for
example, not only guard against transactions that reduce corporate value, but they also
give rise to a right to call a default, thereby permitting a creditor to withdraw capital or
take control when the financial status of the corporation deteriorates through normal
market forces.131 There is no reason to assume that creditors are less able through ex
ante bargaining to protect themselves from actions that may take place in insolvency
than in normal periods.
Thus, there appears to be little reason to justify a shift from shareholder wealth
maximization to creditor or corporate wealth maximization when a corporation becomes
distressed. The shift creates confusion for managers seeking to determine the
standards by which their behavior will be judged. More significant, however, is the
difficulty such a shift in duty creates for financial markets seeking to negotiate and price
creditor protections. A poorly defined, constantly shifting focus for managerial duties
does not provide a stable backdrop for bargaining. How much contractual protection
creditors need is a function of how much protection the law provides. It is difficult to
negotiate specific covenants when there is uncertainty regarding the default rules that
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See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp.
1504 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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In a sense, these financial covenants may operate to shift control of the corporate
assets from shareholders to creditors when the corporation reaches a contractually defined
“vicinity of insolvency.” The failure to achieve financial targets results in an immediate right to
payment, or failing that, a right to take control of the assets through bankruptcy or nonbankruptcy debt collection processes. Although creditors may not exercise these control rights
directly, they may use the leverage these rights provide to negotiate an increase in control
through additional restrictive covenants, creditor initiated management changes and changes in
executive compensation. See Stuart C. Gilson and Michael R Vetsuypens, Creditor Control in
Financially Distressed Firms: Empirical Evidence, 72 Wash U. L.Q. 1005 (1994).
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define managers’ obligations. By the same token, how much risk creditors face is a
function of how the law defines the legal obligation of managers to protect them.
Without an understanding of the risk of a particular investment, one cannot set an
appropriate interest rate. The shifting and ambiguous regimes created by the Delaware
courts create difficulties in pricing and allocating the risk of loss among the
constituencies. Transaction costs increase, and unintended outcomes seem more
likely.132
By contrast, a constant regime with clearly defined duties facilitates efficient
pricing and allocation of risk of loss by corporate investors. Creditors in a constant
regime realize when they price their capital and accept an investment contract and an
interest rate that managers are obligated in all periods prior to bankruptcy to take
actions that benefit shareholders at their expense. Consistency in the application of this
principle allows creditors ex ante efficiently either to demand more interest for the risk or
require covenants to protect them across the entire time spectrum. Creditors may, for
example, demand a poison put to protect themselves from additional corporate leverage
or a net worth covenant that permits exit or a change in control when the financial
condition of the corporation deteriorates for any reason. Applying a constant and
unambiguous rule across the spectrum from normal period through vicinity of insolvency
and insolvency facilitates efficient contracting and allocation of loss.133
Finally, the ambiguous regime creates opportunities for management
misbehavior by rendering enforcement difficult. As Bainbridge has pointed out
“[d]irectors who are responsible to everyone are accountable to no one.”134 A regime
that permits shifting duties may allow managers to pursue their own interests, justifying
their actions by pointing to a duty to one or another constituency. Confusion over the
precise nature of the duty at various stages of financial distress only exacerbates the
problem.
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In all likelihood, the ambiguity created by the shifting duties will cause creditors to
undervalue the protection that the duties provide. Creditors can never be certain when managers
will undertake a duty to look out for their interests. Shareholders, on the other hand, are likely to
overvalue the cost that the shift in duties imposes on them, assuming that managers will seek to
protect creditors at the first available opportunity. Such a distortion can only be remedied by
clear, easily enforceable rules.
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See Ted Janger, Crystals and Mud in Bankruptcy Law: Judicial Competence and
Statutory Design 43 Ariz. L. Rev. 559, 581 (2001) (“Crystalline rules minimize judicial
discretion, clarify property boundaries, and shift resource allocation decisions out of court and
into the market place.”).
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Stephen M. Bainbridge, Much Ado about Little? Directors’ Fiduciary Duties in the
Vicinity of Insolvency, at 23 working paper, on file with authors.
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Thus, not only is a shift in duties unnecessary, it has negative effects on both the
ex ante bargain struck by shareholders, creditors and managers and on the
enforcement of those duties. Maintaining a constant set of duties regardless of the
financial status of the corporation permits the efficient allocation of risk and effective
enforcement of managers’ duties.
C.

The Exception: Manager Fiduciary Duties in Bankruptcy

Once the firm enters bankruptcy, a shift away from a shareholder wealth
maximization regime to a regime that requires the managers of the debtor to maximize
the overall value of the estate for the benefit of both shareholders and creditors makes
sense. Non-shareholder constituencies – principally creditors – are unable to protect
themselves from actions in this period through ex ante contracting. Also, this single
shift does not unduly complicate ex ante contracting and pricing. Rather, the financial
contracting process can account specifically for the shift in duties that bankruptcy
imposes and can build in provisions that make that shift in duties more likely. Finally,
the judicial supervision that characterizes the bankruptcy process reduces the
enforcement problems that a duty to multiple constituencies outside of the confines of
bankruptcy might generate.
This shift in managers’ duty recognizes the changes that bankruptcy imposes on
the governance of the firm. Outside of bankruptcy, the efficiency argument for fiduciary
duties to shareholders depends on the fact that creditors can draft contracts that will
prevent inefficient expropriations of creditor wealth.135 In bankruptcy, however, the
automatic stay prohibits creditors from enforcing their debt contracts and taking control
of the corporation. Thus, continuing to adhere to a requirement that managers act
exclusively for shareholders would promote inefficient uses of corporate assets.
Unchecked, shareholders’ incentive to forestall liquidation regardless of whether
a liquidation would maximize the value of the corporation would lead to inefficient
results. Shareholders of insolvent companies have nothing to lose by delaying
liquidation, but would gain in the event that a reorganization produces enough value to
pay creditors. Thus managers acting on their behalf might use the bankruptcy process
strategically – inefficiently prolonging the reorganization efforts in an attempt to extract
concessions from the creditors.136
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See supra notes 104-107 and accompanying text

Consider, for example, a corporation in bankruptcy with debts of $80 and a
liquidation value of $70. Assume that the corporation has a 50% chance of reorganizing
successfully with a value of $100. If the reorganization fails, however, the assets will be worth
only $20.
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At the same time, as several commentators have pointed out,137 requiring
managers to maximize the value of creditor claims can create inefficiencies in the
opposite direction. Because creditors bear most of the losses of failed reorganization
attempts, but have to share the gains from successful reorganizations with the
shareholders, creditors may have an incentive to inefficiently cut off promising
reorganization efforts.138
The bankruptcy process avoids both of these problems by requiring managers to
focus on the value of the estate, rather than the value of any particular interest in the
estate. In this way the bankruptcy process prohibits inefficient managerial decisions
that transfer wealth between classes of financial investors.
This single shift in duties also has the advantage of providing a bright line
standard that creditors and shareholders can account for in their investment contracts.
By eliminating the confusion surrounding the timing of the shift creditors and
shareholders can price the risk of their investments based on the assumption that the
law will impose an obligation on managers to maximize shareholder wealth outside of
bankruptcy and to maximize the overall value of the corporation during bankruptcy. Not
only does this clarity provide for better pricing, but it also provides a baseline against
which more specific covenants can be crafted.
An attempt at reorganization here would be inefficient, resulting in an expected value of
$60 instead of the $70 value of a present liquidation. Shareholders, however, would opt for the
reorganization. This is because, the expected value to the shareholders of the reorganization is
$10, while the expected value of the liquidation option is zero. The $10 value to shareholders
comes at the expense of creditors who would value this investment at only $50. Managers who
are bound to act in the best interests of shareholders would use every means at their disposal to
insure that the reorganization option is pursued, notwithstanding the fact that the effort results in
the net loss of $10 and an expropriation from creditors of $10 with no efficiency gains. For a
similar example, see Lin, supra note 48 at 1495-96 .
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See Alon Chaver and Jesse M. Fried, Managers’ Fiduciary Duty upon the Firm’s
Insolvency: Accounting for Performance Creditors, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 1813, 1823 (2002); Lin,
supra note 48 at 1492-93; Lipson, supra note 116 at 1225 (2003).
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Assume now that the reorganization efforts chance of success is 80%, but the asset
values remain the same. This increased chance of success would render the effort to reorganize
efficient, with an expected value of $84. Because this value exceeds the present liquidation
value of the corporation, the reorganization is the efficient choice. Of course, shareholders
would agree that the reorganization should be attempted. The expected value of this
reorganization to the shareholders is $16 If however, managers are directed to act in the best
interests of the creditors, the reorganization will not be pursued because the effort would result in
an expected value to the creditors of $68 – $2 less than the value they expect on liquidation. For
a similar example, see Chaver and Fried, supra note 137 at 1823 (example 3).
43

The shift in managers’ fiduciary duties from the shareholders to the estate
provides only a partial response to these inefficient investment incentives, however. In
addition, judicial oversight of specific decisions as well as provisions to replace
managers with a bankruptcy trustee provide a mechanism that helps to assure that
managers fulfill their duties to maximize the value of the assets under their control.139
This close supervision by the bankruptcy judge thus ameliorates the enforcement
problems that inhere in any system that divides managerial loyalties among naturally
adverse constituencies.140
The performance of the bankruptcy process in meeting the goal of asset value
maximization has been the subject of a vigorous scholarly debate for nearly two
decades. Bankruptcy scholarship throughout the late 1980's and early 1990's criticized
the bankruptcy governance structure as being too heavily skewed toward shareholder
interests.141 Managers were depicted as maintaining their allegiance to shareholders,
taking actions that prolonged the reorganization of firms that should have been
liquidated quickly. The bias of managers toward reorganization was seen as an effort

139 In fact, several commentators have noted that as a control on managers behavior, fiduciary
duties are much less important in bankruptcy than they are outside of the process. In their
empirical study of corporate governance in publically held corporations, LoPucki and Whitford
stated that fiduciary obligations in bankruptcy are largely of “theoretical value” because creditors
and shareholders have an opportunity to directly challenge managerial conduct in the
reorganization process. Lynn M. LoPucki and Whitford C. Whitford, Corporate Governance in
the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publically Held Companies, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 669,
709-710 (1993).
140
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See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
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on their part to use their continued control over the business to force inefficient wealth
transfers from creditor classes to shareholder classes.142
More recently, some bankruptcy scholars have detected a shift in the opposite
direction. Increasingly sophisticated creditors, particularly secured creditors, employing
tools such as debtor in possession financing and management retention agreements,
have managed to seize control of the bankruptcy process in some cases – effectively
forcing a shift toward creditor value maximization and a bias toward liquidation of
healthy companies.143 If present, this liquidation bias may create inefficiencies no less
troubling than those created by a reorganization bias by prematurely liquidating
companies that have a positive going concern value.144
Whether these claims of inefficient reorganization or liquidation bias are
sustainable is beyond the scope of this paper. If Chapter 11 is dominated by senior
secured creditors seeking to use the process to maximize their own recoveries, that fact
would provide even more reason to require managers to adhere to a duty to maximize
the value of the estate. In addition, as a general matter, Bankruptcy judges have shown
themselves to be sensitive to the presence of liquidation and reorganization bias and
creative in developing techniques to combat them. What remains important for our
purposes is the general attitude that the path to efficiency lies in focusing on the value
of the assets and in requiring managers to adhere to that focus.
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See, e.g. Bradley and Rosenzweig, supra note 141 at 1076 (“"Filing a Chapter 11
petition, in effect, is a way to keep control of the firm free from the intrusive monitoring of
creditors, thereby permitting management to extract wealth from the firm's various security
holders.")
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See Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 Stan L.
Rev. 751 (2002); Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 Stan.
L. Rev. 673 (2003); David A. Skeel Jr., Creditors’ Ball The “New” New Corporate Governance
in Chapter 11, 152 U. Penn. L. Rev. 917 (2003); George W. Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11 21
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56 Stan. L. Rev. 645 (2003).
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IV. Conclusion
The governance of the modern corporation generally relies on some combination
of contractual and fiduciary regulation. As a matter of positive law, the governance
rules applicable to solvent corporations obligate managers to fulfill their fiduciary duty to
maximize shareholder wealth. Creditors and other constituencies must seek protection
through contract. Although the rule itself is controversial, it at least has the virtue of
providing clarity for managers seeking to fulfill their duties, for courts evaluating
managers’ actions, and, most importantly, for investors seeking to negotiate contracts
and price their investments.
Recent judicial decisions that attempt to articulate a shift in that duty as a
corporation becomes financially distressed have thrown this straightforward rule into
chaos. Courts have failed to formulate clear standards regarding both the timing of the
shift and the ultimate beneficiaries of the duties at the particular stages of financial
decline. As a result, the clarity that permits efficient contracting is lost.
This state of affairs is both unfortunate and unnecessary. Nothing about
insolvency, per se, dictates that a separate set of rules should govern the relationship
among shareholders, creditors and managers. In fact, creditor contracts are fashioned
with insolvency in mind. Restrictive covenants and the definition of default under
creditor contracts contemplate that the corporations financial status can change and
these provisions often are structured in a way to permit creditors to exercise more
control over the assets when a company becomes financially distressed. The initiation
of a bankruptcy case provides the only point at which these obligations should shift.
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